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ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT OF 
CONSUMER CONTRACTS 
YEHUDA ADAR* 
SHMUEL I. BECHER** 
Abstract: Current approaches to consumer standard form contracts generally as-
sume that aggrieved consumers can adequately detect and challenge exploitative 
terms and that vigilant courts can effectively scrutinize them. Some even believe 
that market forces and reputational constraints can deter firms from incorporating 
exploitative terms into their form contracts or dissuade them from actually rely-
ing on such terms. Criticizing these assumptions, this Article calls for a concep-
tual shift toward the problem of exploitative consumer contracts. This Article 
suggests supplementing the current means of addressing exploitation in consumer 
contracts with a dynamic preventive model of administrative oversight. Specifi-
cally, this Article proposes a professional system of public supervision over the 
content of consumer form contracts. This Article demonstrates how such a mech-
anism, if shrewdly designed, can cost-effectively tackle the widespread use of 
unfair, unconscionable, or legally invalid terms. Although not a panacea, the pro-
posed regulatory regime has the promise of shifting the main burden of tackling 
exploitative boilerplate from the currently feeble and ineffective system of pri-
vate enforcement to a sophisticated and robust scheme of administrative scrutiny. 
INTRODUCTION 
Consumer standard form contracts (consumer contracts) typically contain 
harsh and imbalanced terms that can harm consumers.1 In a sense, these terms 
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1 See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, 
AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013) (detailing how consumer contracts harm consumers, undermine their 
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can be compared to viruses. Like viruses, these potentially harmful terms are 
everywhere, yet may seem benign or dormant much of the time. Consumers 
can easily find themselves agreeing to such terms without being aware of their 
existence and latent risks.2 Furthermore, boilerplate terms can often be modi-
fied unilaterally by firms and thus may mutate, with consumers unaware as to 
the nature of the mutation and the risks it might entail.3 
Although both viruses and imbalanced consumer contracts have a nega-
tive reputation, their existence can sometimes make sense and even be benefi-
cial.4 Consumer contracts can reduce friction and transaction costs.5 Also, 
some seemingly imbalanced standardized terms can be economically justified 
and reasonable. Such terms may reduce sellers’ costs, resulting in better prices 
for consumers.6 
Unfortunately, however, imbalanced boilerplate terms are typically not 
the result of a transparent economic calculus. Quite often, such terms reflect 
manipulative strategies and various market failures,7 resulting in a lack of 
                                                                                                                           
rights, and challenge the rule of law). The terms “consumer form contract” or “consumer contract,” 
refer to those standardized contracts, otherwise known as “adhesion contracts,” between a business 
and a consumer, which are “prepared by one party, to be signed by another party in a weaker posi-
tion.” See Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
2 See discussion infra Part I (examining exploitative boilerplate terms and their social costs). See 
generally OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN 
CONSUMER MARKETS (2012) (discussing exploitation of consumer cognitive biases in specific key 
markets). 
 3 For discussion of the issue of unilateral modifications of consumer contracts, see, for example, 
Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty Promises, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8–26 (2010); Shmuel I. Becher 
& Uri Benoliel, Sneak In Contracts, 55 GA. L. REV. 657, 666–87 (2021). 
4 For discussions of how viruses could potentially contribute to human welfare, see, for example, 
Am. Soc’y for Microbiology, Viruses: You’ve Heard the Bad; Here’s the Good, SCI. DAILY (Apr. 30, 
2015), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/04/150430170750.htm [https://perma.cc/987R-
P7JX]; Beth Skwarecki, Friendly Viruses Protect Us Against Bacteria, SCIENCE (May 20, 2013), 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2013/05/friendly-viruses-protect-us-against-bacteria [https://perma.
cc/GM42-ZEM2]. See also Katherine J. Wu, Nothing Eats Viruses, Right? Meet Some Hungry Pro-
tists, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/24/science/virus-eaters-protists.html [https://
perma.cc/89FR-96CH] (Sept. 25, 2020) (“Rather than acting only as disease-causing agents of chaos 
and snuffing out life, viruses might in some cases play a role in fueling and sustaining it.”). 
5 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in 
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 89 (1977) (“The form contract econo-
mizes on the costs of contract negotiation by providing a set of terms to govern in the absence of ex-
plicit negotiations.”). 
6 See generally Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribu-
tion in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991) (discussing, among other things, the 
relationship between better rules and protections to buyers and sellers’ ability to pass on costs and 
charge higher prices as a result). 
7 See Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge That Is 
Yet to Be Met, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 723, 733–35 (2008) (discussing the problems arising from infor-
mation asymmetry between firms and consumers). See generally Meirav Furth-Matzkin & Roseanna 
Sommers, Consumer Psychology and the Problem of Fine-Print Fraud, 72 STAN. L. REV. 503 (2020) 
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competition over non-salient terms.8 Yet, like viruses, exploitative terms in 
consumer contracts are hard to detect, delineate, control, and contain.9 Follow-
ing this analogy, this Article calls for a conceptual shift whereby ex ante ad-
ministrative control serves as a key component in the prevention of boilerplate 
exploitation.10 
To be sure, academics have studied the phenomenon of consumer con-
tracts and the unique problems they create from multiple angles.11 Mounting 
theoretical insights and empirical findings explain how firms can easily impose 
unfair and inefficient terms on consumers by taking advantage of consumers’ 
lack of expertise, cognitive biases, difficulty in processing data, unfounded 
trust, lack of familiarity with relevant legal rules, and various other vulnerabili-
ties.12 Consumers’ inferiority vis-à-vis the businesses with which they interact 
and their lack of interest or ability to litigate open limitless opportunities for 
exploitation.13 This persistent reality has led legislators, courts, and scholars to 
                                                                                                                           
(discussing firms’ practice of making loud promises that are negated in the fine print of their consum-
er contracts); Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and Contract Schemas: A 
Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers’ Propensity to Sue, 15 
BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 83 (1997) (discussing the chilling effect that exculpatory terms have on consum-
ers); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745 
(2014) (discussing consumers’ tendency to blame themselves for not reading fine print, even when the 
terms are biased and unfair). 
8 See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1238–39 (2003) (discussing circumstances wherein a term’s salience to par-
ticular groups of consumers may result in drafters avoiding competition over those consumers and 
instead targeting consumers for whom the term is non-salient). 
9 See discussion infra Part I (discussing the varying forms of exploitation in consumer contracts). 
10 See discussion infra Part III (exploring the central justifications behind an administrative solu-
tion to boilerplate exploitation, as well as its benefits and shortcomings). 
11 Cf. Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 679 
(noting that the literature on consumer contracts “is prodigious”).  
12 For some recent analyses of how firms use exploitative terms to the detriment of consumers, 
see generally Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, Minding the Gap, 51 CONN. L. REV. 69 (2019) (dis-
cussing the concern that firms will impose harsh contracts terms on vulnerable consumers yet reveal 
leniency toward others); Meirav Furth-Matzkin, On the Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract 
Terms: Evidence from the Residential Rental Market, 9 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2017) [hereinafter 
Furth-Matzkin, Unexpected Use] (discussing unenforceable terms in the context of landlord and tenant 
law); Meirav Furth-Matzkin, The Harmful Effects of Unenforceable Contract Terms: Experimental 
Evidence, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1031 (2019) [hereinafter Furth-Matzkin, Harmful Effects] (discussing the 
results of experimental studies relating to unenforceable terms in residential rental agreements); Tess 
Wilkinson-Ryan, Justifying Bad Deals, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 193 (2020) (discussing consumer psychol-
ogy and particularly consumers’ deference to terms in consumer contracts); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, 
The Perverse Consequences of Disclosing Standard Terms, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 117 (2017) [herein-
after Wilkinson-Ryan, Perverse Consequences] (discussing consumer responses, or lack thereof, to 
the disclosure of terms in the fine print of consumer contracts). 
13 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (2004) (“Absent 
legal intervention, the sophisticated seller will often exploit the consumer’s behavioral biases.”); Todd 
D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1176, 1242, 
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recognize the need to protect consumers from abusive contracting practices, 
including the use of certain imbalanced standard terms.14 
Despite this wide acknowledgment, there is little agreement over the kind 
and scope of the appropriate protections.15 At one end of the spectrum, there is 
the market-based approach. Its proponents regard the risk of exploitation as a 
reasonable price that consumers are, and should be, willing to pay for the bene-
fits associated with the use of standardized contracts. Under this approach, any 
regulatory reform elicits great suspicion. Opportunistic exploitation and other 
abusive practices are better left, so they argue, to the self-regulation of the 
market.16 
                                                                                                                           
1250–55, 1258 (1983) (proposing that any non-negotiated terms ought to be considered presumptively 
unenforceable, unless clearly “visible” to consumers). 
14 See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 215–21 (2002); 
id. at 217 (“Welfare economic analysis may favor . . . replacing one-sided contract terms with more 
reasonable ones . . . . That unsophisticated buyers may become subject to value-reducing [contractual] 
arrangements is obvious.”); Margaret Jane Radin, What Boilerplate Said: A Response to Omri Ben-
Shahar (and a Diagnosis) 1 (Univ. of Mich. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Rsch. Paper Series, Paper No. 
392, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2401720 [https://perma.cc/S3F9-FRU8] (“Old-school ‘Chicago’ 
law-and-economics seems to be giving way to a more nuanced theoretical approach . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)); see also infra notes 17–20 and accompanying text (noting those who advocate for non-
market-based solutions to consumer protection from exploitative boilerplate); infra Sections II.B–C 
(discussing existing legislative and judicial approaches to boilerplate consumer exploitation). 
15 Cf. Jean Braucher, Unfair Terms in Comparative Perspective: Software Contracts, in COM-
MERCIAL CONTRACT LAW: TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES 339, 339 (Larry A. DiMatteo et al. eds., 
2013) (“[M]ost policymakers, regulators, and scholars concede that there often can be no real assent to 
mass-market standard terms, but then balk at meaningful solutions to address market failure.”). 
16 For arguments in favor of market solutions to exploitative boilerplate terms, see generally Lu-
cian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006) (justifying seemingly “exploitative” terms on grounds of asymmetric risk 
of harm to the firm’s reputation); Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and 
Market Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111 (2006) (discussing consumer mistakes and maturation 
and noting the corrective sufficiency of existing legal and market remedies); Richard A. Epstein, The 
Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 803, 809 (2008) (“[A]mbitious 
efforts to combat cognitive mistakes by direct regulation or disclosure provisions do not . . . overcome 
the strong presumption of error under which they should be evaluated.”); Richard A. Epstein, Uncon-
scionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975) (advocating a thin procedural ap-
proach to unconscionability on libertarian and utilitarian grounds). Notably, even under this approach, 
state intervention may be justified in face of clear market failures if those failures can be remedied 
cost-effectively. See generally KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 14, at 217; Ian Ayres & Alan 
Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 553 (2014) 
(proposing the mandatory use of warning boxes as a response to consumers’ tendency not to read 
boilerplate terms); George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 
(1981) (noting conceptions of consumer product warranties as exploitative but arguing for a view of 
such warranties as a mutual investment between the consumer and firm to prolong the life of the 
product); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Infor-
mation: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979) (arguing that legal actors 
should only intervene in consumer markets after the market has been determined to be noncompeti-
tive). 
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At the other end lies what may be dubbed the “interventionist approach.” 
According to this approach, most consumer markets feature chronic market 
failures that justify ongoing public scrutiny. Thus, this argument goes, con-
sumer contracts deserve radically different legal treatment than ordinary or 
classical business contracts. Advocates of this approach call for much strong-
er—and wider—legal control over both the procedural and the substantive as-
pects of consumer contracts.17 
Elsewhere on this spectrum, one finds innumerable middle ground ap-
proaches. While acknowledging the gravity of the problem, members of this 
ever-growing camp recommend milder and more nuanced solutions than those 
imagined by the interventionists. These middle ground options include the im-
position of wider disclosure or transparency duties on firms;18 bolder judicial 
application of traditional contract doctrines such as unconscionability, interpre-
tation, etc.;19 and the establishment of voluntary mechanisms for approving 
standard forms.20 
                                                                                                                           
17 See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 
(1960) (suggesting that, in addition to consumers’ broader assent to unread but reasonable terms that 
do not undermine the meaning of the bargained-for terms, the only boilerplate terms to which con-
sumers specifically assent are those few that were bargained for); W. David Slawson, Standard Form 
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971) (arguing 
that consumer contract terms are “almost universally unfair”); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Comment, Un-
conscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1162 (1976) (“Most clauses of standard 
form contracts are candidates for nonenforcement.”). See generally RADIN, supra note 1 (severely 
criticizing the current legal regime and favorably discussing stronger regulatory solutions to combat 
harsh boilerplate terms). 
18 See, e.g., Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 555; Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Rem-
edies: Ordering Firms to Eradicate Their Own Fraud, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 30 (2017) 
(positing that firms should reduce consumers’ confusion and demonstrate that their consumers com-
prehend their interactions and dealings with the firm). See generally Uri Benoliel & Shmuel I. Becher, 
The Duty to Read the Unreadable, 60 B.C. L. REV. 2255 (2019) (arguing that courts should not apply 
the “duty to read” to unreadable contracts). 
19 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 211(3) (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“Where the 
other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew 
that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.”); Wayne R. Barnes, 
Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement 
Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227 (2007) (endorsing revival of the 211(3) doctrine to combat 
unfairness in consumer contracts); Jacob Hale Russell, Unconscionability’s Greatly Exaggerated 
Death, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965 (2019) (suggesting adjustments in the unconscionability doctrine 
to better address consumers’ heterogeneity). For further discussion, see infra Section II.C (assessing 
the efficacy of judicial scrutiny in regulating boilerplate terms). 
20 See, e.g., Shmuel I. Becher, A “Fair Contracts” Approval Mechanism: Reconciling Consumer 
Contracts and Conventional Contract Law, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 747, 770 (2009); Clayton P. 
Gillette, Pre-approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 975, 983–84 (2005); cf. 
Bar-Gill & Davis, supra note 3, at 7–8 (envisioning a voluntary approval-based solution to issues 
posed by unilateral contract modification). For a critical discussion of this idea, see infra Subsection 
III.B.4 (arguing that administrative oversight is a more effective solution to consumer exploitation 
than voluntary pre-approval). 
2022] Administrative Oversight of Consumer Contracts 2411 
Against this rich and versatile body of literature, this Article offers three 
main contributions. Part I of this Article suggests an analytical distinction be-
tween legally invalid, unconscionable, and unfair exploitative terms, thereby 
adding much-needed clarity to current descriptions of exploitative boiler-
plate.21 Part II provides an up-to-date and critical assessment of the current ap-
proaches toward the problem of exploitative consumer contracts.22 This critical 
analysis highlights the need for reform. Finally, Part III supplies a fully-fledged 
case for administrative oversight over consumer contracts.23 It argues that a bold, 
clever, and stable system of professional public supervision will greatly reduce 
the potential, and incentive, for contractual exploitation of consumers. 
Surprisingly, the vast American literature on consumer contracts has—
until now—failed to thoroughly investigate the potential of administrative 
oversight over consumer contracts. Although there seems to be a growing 
scholarly tendency to mention administrative regulation as an optional en-
forcement tool,24 discussions of this option have too often been sketchy and 
incomplete.25 As this Article delineates below, administrative scrutiny can be 
superior to judicial scrutiny, legislative control, or market forces.26 
At first glance, administrative scrutiny over consumer contracts may seem 
a complicated measure of enforcement. This Article argues, however, that—
like in many other domains—systematic prevention may be wiser, more effec-
                                                                                                                           
21 See infra notes 28–96 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 97–198 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 199–275 and accompanying text. 
24 See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 14, at 217 & n.146 (mentioning the administrative 
option and noting that “[i]f reasonably accurate legal intervention were possible at low cost, then 
parties would generally be better off” (footnote omitted)); RADIN, supra note 1, at 240 (“US legisla-
tures or administrative bodies could at least consider disallowing certain [boilerplate] clauses . . . .”); 
Furth-Matzkin & Sommers, supra note 7, at 544–45 (suggesting statutory damages, fee-shifting provi-
sions, and even administrative enforcement to combat fine-print fraud); Furth-Matzkin, Harmful Ef-
fects, supra note 12, at 1065–66 (briefly proposing state pre-approved lease agreements); Todd D. 
Rakoff, Commentary, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1235, 1243 (2006) 
(suggesting that a variety of bodies, including administrative agencies, can carry out boilerplate scru-
tiny); Eyal Zamir & Yuval Farkash, Standard Form Contracts: Empirical Studies, Normative Implica-
tions, and the Fragmentation of Legal Scholarship: Comments on Florencia Marotta-Wurgler’s Stud-
ies, 12 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 137, 167 (2015) (positing that the tendency toward disclosure-
based protections is inadequate as compared to effective administrative oversight). 
25 For two notable exceptions where the administrative option was more carefully examined, see 
Larry Bates, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A Comparative Analysis of Con-
sumer Protection, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 90–105 (2002) (strongly supporting the option, but 
failing to address many pragmatic challenges) and Gillette, supra note 20, at 986–88 (assessing the 
challenges associated with a non-mandatory pre-approval system of standard online contracts). 
26 See discussion infra Section III.B. 
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tive, and ultimately cheaper than treatment.27 Rather than allowing harmful 
boilerplate terms to freely flood consumer markets uncontrolled, policy-
makers should make a conscious effort to significantly reduce the frequency at 
which consumers face harmful exploitative terms in the first place. Instead of 
expecting uninformed, unmotivated, and dispersed consumers to challenge 
such standard terms in court (or in arbitration) ex post, professional public 
agencies can shrewdly and cost-effectively monitor consumer contracts in or-
der to detect, deter, and respond to the use of such terms ex ante, even before 
they harm consumers. 
Under the model that this Article envisages, the scrutinizing agency will 
systematically collect samples of widely distributed boilerplates in various 
economic sectors. It will then subject these forms to systematic scrutiny. 
Where exploitation seems evident, serious enough, and sufficiently widespread 
across a certain economic sector, the agency will request the firm or business 
offering the suspect term to remove, revise, or justify its use. If, after delibera-
tion, no consent is reached, the agency may issue an order restraining the fur-
ther use of the provisions deemed exploitative. A potential civil or administra-
tive penalty will bolster such an order. This Article further envisages that the 
agency’s decision concerning the scrutinized form of a given firm will also 
incentivize other market participants to improve their own form contracts, thus 
amplifying the system’s overall effectiveness. 
To be sure, this proposed model involves serious challenges and is in no 
way a silver bullet. As the discussion that ensues illustrates, avoiding regulato-
ry capture, building public trust, navigating political storms, and coordinating 
with other enforcement agencies will require persistence, courage, and vision. 
Nevertheless, given the enduring failures of the current system, it seems that 
the time is ripe for a conceptual shift toward exploitative consumer boilerplate. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF EXPLOITATIVE BOILERPLATE 
Consumers routinely face exploitative and potentially harmful boilerplate 
terms. This Part clarifies the nature of this risk. Section A succinctly depicts 
the roots of the problem. 28 Next, Section B offers an analytical distinction be-
tween three types of exploitative boilerplate terms. 29 Thereafter, Section C 
delineates the unique social costs of exploitative terms. 30 
                                                                                                                           
27 Cf. Shmuel I. Becher, Unintended Consequences and the Design of Consumer Protection Leg-
islation, 93 TUL. L. REV. 105, 112–13 (2018) (discussing the reasons that may lead people to under-
value prevention in the context of consumer protection legislation). 
28 See infra notes 31–42 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 43–75 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 76–96 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Roots of Exploitation: When Drafter Domination  
Meets Consumer Vulnerability 
Consumer contracts are typically pre-drafted and offered on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis.31 The average consumer does not have any input on the specific 
content of most of the terms governing the transaction.32 Furthermore, in cer-
tain markets, consumers face little variation in contract terms.33 Therefore, it is 
unsurprising that consumers generally do not even attempt to read their con-
tracts,34 which quite often are unreadable to begin with.35 Consumers typically 
lack sufficient incentive to invest effort (including time, energy, and money) 
into studying non-negotiable terms.36 Consumers’ indifference and inattention 
are especially acute with respect to “non-salient” terms—that is to say, terms 
                                                                                                                           
31 See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 1, at 9 (“Standardized form contracts, when they are imposed upon 
consumers, have long been called ‘contracts of adhesion,’ or ‘take-it-or-leave-it contracts,’ because 
the recipient has no choice with regard to the terms.” (footnote omitted)); Slawson, supra note 17, at 
530 (“Even the fastidious few who take the time to read the standard form may be helpless to vary it. 
The form may be part of an offer which the consumer has no reasonable alternative but to accept.”). 
32 See, e.g., Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 142–43 (1970) [herein-
after Leff, Contract]; Slawson, supra note 17, at 532 (“The power to contract in this situation is the 
power of one party to impose whatever terms he likes on the other.”). See generally Friedrich Kessler, 
Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943) 
(discussing the evolution and proliferation of boilerplate consumer contracts); Arthur Allen Leff, 
Unconscionability and the Crowd—Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 
349 (1970) [hereinafter Leff, Consumers] (discussing unconscionability in the context of typical con-
sumer contracts, wherein the consumer simply accepts the terms as presented). 
33 Firms often mimic and copy boilerplate terms from one another. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & 
Jeffery J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 435–
36 (2002); Slawson, supra note 17, at 531 (“Most buyers probably believe (correctly) that the forms 
they could have bought from a competing seller would have been just as bad anyway.”). This is not to 
say that consumer contracts are static or that variations never exist across suppliers of similar prod-
ucts. See generally Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and Innovation 
in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240 (2013) (documenting the dynamic 
nature of standardized End User License Agreements (EULAs), a common type of boilerplate form 
used for online software product transactions). 
34 See Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-
Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 32 (2014) (establishing empirically that very few consumers 
read EULAs). Notably, this holds true even with respect to contract law professors. Jeff Sovern, The 
Content of Consumer Law Classes III, 22 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 2, 4 (2018) (reporting survey re-
sults according to which 57% of consumer law professors “rarely or never read [consumer] con-
tracts”). 
35 See Benoliel & Becher, supra note 18, at 2277–78 (finding that more than 99% of the five hun-
dred standard online contracts studied were unreadable for the average consumer); Marotta-Wurgler & 
Taylor, supra note 33, at 253 (finding that the language used in EULAs resembles that of scientific 
articles). 
36 See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 11, at 680 (“[F]ailure to read may be perfectly rational, especially 
given the inability to negotiate around terms . . . .”). 
2414 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:2405 
whose impact is less direct, obvious, or accessible to the average consumer.37 
This, in turn, leads to a fundamental market failure known as imperfect (or 
asymmetric) information.38 
In addition, consumers suffer from various cognitive biases that affect 
their purchasing patterns and make them less likely to appreciate the legal risks 
entailed in consumer contracts.39 Moreover, as recent experimental studies 
demonstrate, the fine print influences consumers’ moral calculus, leading the 
typical consumer to assume that they are morally and legally bound by the fine 
print, even when it contains clearly unenforceable terms.40 
Aware of these vulnerabilities, and given competitive pressure, firms are 
likely to incorporate exploitative terms into their form contracts. Such terms 
enable firms to reduce their overall expected costs and thus to increase their 
profits, or offer more competitive prices, in a way that is non-transparent to 
most consumers.41 Nevertheless, these “hidden” burdens are not necessarily 
accompanied by a corresponding full price reduction, or any other benefit, to 
consumers.42 The next Section sheds light on the various forms that exploita-
tive boilerplate may take. 
                                                                                                                           
37 See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 8, at 1225 (defining the non-salient terms of a transaction as 
those terms dealing with “product attributes that are not evaluated, compared, and priced as part of the 
purchase decision”). 
38 For further discussion of the market failure of asymmetric information and its normative impli-
cations, see discussion infra Section II.A. 
39 See, e.g., Bar-Gill, supra note 13, at 1375–76; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition 
and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 213–25 (1995); Korobkin, supra note 8, at 1216–
44. For further discussion of the normative implications of consumers’ bounded rationality, see infra 
Part II.A. 
40 See Furth-Matzkin & Sommers, supra note 7, at 541–42; Furth-Matzkin, Harmful Effects, su-
pra note 12, at 1058–59; Wilkinson-Ryan, Perverse Consequences, supra note 12, at 140–44; Wil-
kinson-Ryan, supra note 7, at 1760–62. One of the first to study and detect this psychological effect 
was Warren Mueller. See Warren Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An Empirical Study, 
69 MICH. L. REV. 247, 276–77 (1970). For further discussion of exploitation through legally invalid 
standard terms, see infra Subsection I.B.1. 
41 See, e.g., Eyal Zamir (featuring Ian Ayres), A Theory of Mandatory Rules: Typology, Policy, 
and Design, 99 TEX. L. REV. 283, 295 (2020) (suggesting that most contractual terms in standard form 
contracts are “practically invisible for most consumers”). 
42 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 MICH. L. REV. 
883, 893 (2014) (“Firms offer a variety of consumer-friendly legal arrangements . . . . But when they 
do so, they make sure not to hide such attractive perks in the fine print. . . . It is mostly the stuff that 
consumers might not like (if they took the time to understand it) that is quietly tucked into the fine 
print.”); see also Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem 
of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 743 (1999) (noting that firms “will respond to mar-
ket incentives by manipulating consumer perceptions in whatever manner maximizes profits”). See 
generally Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated Trans-
action Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635 (2006) (describing various tactics firms use to divert 
consumer’s attention from problematic standard terms, thus reducing market competition over terms). 
For further discussion of the effect of market pressure on sellers’ propensity to incorporate exploita-
tive terms, see infra Section II.A. 
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B. The Threefold Face of Boilerplate Exploitation: Legally  
Invalid, Unconscionable, and Unfair Terms 
The terminology used to describe illegitimate terms in consumer contracts 
is inconsistent. Courts, legislatures, and academics refer to such terms employ-
ing a wide range of pejorative labels, such as bad, onerous, oppressive, imbal-
anced, outrageous, exploitive, one-sided, and unfair.43 This Article uses the 
term “exploitative” to describe potentially harmful boilerplate terms that are 
unfair to the consumer either because of the way by which they have been 
(mis)represented (procedural exploitation) or because they are substantively 
unfair under a certain moral or economic test (substantive exploitation). In 
what follows, this Article highlights an important analytical distinction be-
tween three types or categories of exploitative terms. The differences between 
these categories are conceptually significant and, as Part III explains, have im-
portant policy implications. 
1. Legally Invalid Terms 
This Article uses the phrase “legally invalid term” to indicate a contract 
clause that contradicts a mandatory legal norm (statutory or common law) in 
such a way that results in its theoretical nullity and unenforceability. Such a 
norm may be a rule expressly prohibiting the use of certain contractual terms44 
or expressly declaring its nullity.45 It can also be any other rule or principle 
from statutory or common law from which the nullity of a conflicting agree-
ment may be inferred.46 In our view, when such legally invalid terms are po-
tentially harmful from the consumer’s perspective, they are exploitative as 
much as they are invalid.47 
                                                                                                                           
43 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (using 
the term “exploitive”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 208 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1981) (apply-
ing the term “unfair”); Barnes, supra note 19, at 241 (referring to the notions “oppressive” and “outra-
geous”); Gillette, supra note 20, at 982 (employing the term “one-sided”); Kornhauser, supra note 17, 
at 1164, 1166 (mentioning the terms “bad” and “onerous”). 
44 See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 201(a) (UNIF. L. 
COMM’N 2015) (“A lease may include terms and conditions not prohibited by this [act] or law other 
than this [act].”); id. § 203(a) (prohibiting the inclusion of certain requirements in residential leases). 
45 See, e.g., Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 45b(b)(1) (invalidating as 
“void from the inception” certain standardized terms that impede consumer review of the firm’s prod-
ucts, services, or actions). 
46 For example, the common law public policy against contractual penalties makes any agreed-to 
contract damages that serve as a penalty unenforceable. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTS. § 356(1); DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES–EQUITY–
RESTITUTION § 12.9(1) (3d ed. 2018). 
47 On the unfairness involved in using unenforceable terms, see, for example, Bailey Kuklin, On 
the Knowing Inclusion of Unenforceable Contract and Lease Terms, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 845, 845–46, 
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Traditionally, the literature on consumer contracts has given little atten-
tion to exploitation of this kind. This is perhaps understandable due to the as-
sumption that legally void terms are presumably unenforceable, and thus can 
neither harm consumers nor exploit them. Further, from the drafting party’s 
perspective, it might seem futile to employ a term that it presumably could 
never enforce against the consumer. 
Reality proves this line of reasoning naive. For a variety of reasons, legal-
ly unenforceable terms can greatly benefit form-drafters who may often use 
them against consumers. 
First, most consumers might not be aware that a term is legally invalid. In 
fact, even form-users may not always be aware of the fact that they are using 
legally invalid terms. For example, a firm can innocently continue to use a 
term that new legislation has explicitly or implicitly invalidated. Consumers 
may therefore abide by the legally invalid term voluntarily or accept the sell-
er’s demand to comply with it.48 
Second, as we have already emphasized, consumers tend to believe that 
the fine print is legally binding even when it is not, especially if the term is 
drafted authoritatively.49 
Third, even if a consumer suspects that a term is legally invalid, they may 
still avoid confronting a powerful and experienced business, particularly one 
on which they may often depend. Thus, a legally invalid term can nonetheless 
have a chilling effect on consumers who may be unwilling or unable to effec-
tively challenge it.50 
Last but not least, offering consumers forms containing legally invalid 
terms has not, to the best of our knowledge, been recognized by courts or public 
enforcement agencies as a potentially “unfair or deceptive practice” under Unfair 
or Deceptive Acts or Practices (UDAP) laws.51 Hence, businesses lack a suffi-
cient incentive to avoid this type of exploitation. Slightly restated, from the sell-
er’s perspective, the worst-case scenario entails not being able to enforce the 
                                                                                                                           
846 (1988) (“It seems unfair that one should knowingly take advantage of another’s ignorance of the 
law when, by including an unenforceable contract or lease term, one is misleading the other . . . .”). 
48 See, e.g., Kurt E. Olafsen, Note, Preventing the Use of Unenforceable Provisions in Residential 
Leases, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 522, 522 (1979) (“Even though these clauses have no legal effect, land-
lords continue to include them in their leases. The reason is simple—a clause with no legal effect can 
still have tremendous practical effect if the tenant believes that it is binding.”); see also Stolle & Slain, 
supra note 7, at 91 (finding a clear correlation between the existence of an exculpatory clause and the 
propensity of aggrieved consumers to forgo seeking compensation). 
49 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
50 See, e.g., Furth-Matzkin, Harmful Effects, supra note 12, at 1035 (“The experimental findings 
revealed that tenants reading contracts including unenforceable terms were . . . about eight times more 
likely to bear costs that the law imposed on the landlord than were tenants with contracts containing 
enforceable terms.”). 
51 For further discussion of this regulatory option, see infra Section III.D. 
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provision against the consumer. Nevertheless, the seller will not be subject to 
any additional sanction for using it in the first place. 
Although a few scholars have shed light on this phenomenon,52 only re-
cently have empirical studies established its wide scope and serious harmful ef-
fects on consumers.53 The literature has documented the continuous usage of 
(theoretically) unenforceable terms in various domains, such as residential leas-
ing,54 employment,55 and insurance.56 Part III of this Article discusses the crucial 
role of administrative oversight in tackling this troubling, and largely neglected, 
phenomenon. 
2. Voidable Unconscionable Terms 
The unconscionability doctrine, incorporated into section 2-302 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC), plays a vital role in combating exploitation in 
contracts generally57 and consumer contracts in particular.58 According to this 
                                                                                                                           
52 See, e.g., Kuklin, supra note 47, at 845–46. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling 
Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127 (2009) (discussing the wide-
spread inclusion of unenforceable contract terms as a market failure). 
53 See, e.g., Furth-Matzkin, Unexpected Use, supra note 12, at 40 (finding that residential leases 
in Massachusetts regularly include unenforceable terms); see also Furth-Matzkin & Sommers, supra 
note 7, at 546 (concluding from empirical studies that consumers felt bound by boilerplate terms even 
when those terms contradicted the seller’s prior misrepresentations about the contents of their con-
tracts); Furth-Matzkin, Harmful Effects, supra note 12, at 1035–36 (finding, based upon experimental 
studies, that respondent-tenants seeking Massachusetts residencies were more likely to bear costs 
legally intended for landlords and to refrain from conducting further online research due to the inclu-
sion of unenforceable terms in boilerplate residential leases); Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 7, at 1765 
(finding, based upon experimental studies, that respondents believed the use of fine print terms to 
impose fees was inappropriate on the part of the seller but also that respondents strongly believed 
consumers who agreed to terms without reading them are blameworthy for transactional harms). 
54 See, e.g., Allen R. Bentley, An Alternative Residential Lease, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 836, 836 
(1974) (“The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act threatens terms contained in almost all 
current leases . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Furth-Matzkin, Unexpected Use, supra note 12, at 40 (noting 
the use of unenforceable terms in residential leases); David Vance Kirby, Contract Law and the Form 
Lease: Can Contract Law Provide the Answer?, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 204, 206 (1976) (arguing that 
residential leases reflect contract law’s inability to manage form contracts); Olafsen, supra note 48, at 
523–24 (discussing certain terms in residential leases determined to be unenforceable by courts and 
legislatures). 
55 See Catherine L. Fisk, Reflections on the New Psychological Contract and the Ownership of 
Human Capital, 34 CONN. L. REV. 765, 782–83 (2002) (positing that employers in California often 
use unenforceable non-compete clauses); Sullivan, supra note 52, at 1147–57 (discussing the inclu-
sion of unenforceable postemployment non-compete clauses and arbitration agreements in employ-
ment contracts). 
56 See generally Robert L. Tucker, Disappearing Ink: The Emerging Duty to Remove Invalid Pol-
icy Provisions, 42 AKRON L. REV. 519 (2009) (discussing certain illegal exclusions of, or restrictions 
on, insurance coverage). 
57 See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTS. § 208 (AM. L. INST. 1981). For a discussion of the doctrine’s expansion to virtually any type 
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doctrine, a court may refuse to enforce a contract or a clause therein if the court 
finds it unconscionable.59 In other words, contract terms that are unconscionable 
are legally voidable in the sense of being permanently subject, at least theoreti-
cally, to judicial nullification (or modification). 
The exact conceptual content of unconscionability is hard to depict and is 
rarely definitively portrayed.60 Nevertheless, in due course, it has become quite 
clear that unconscionability involves a combination or interaction of a procedur-
al and a substantive aspect.61 Procedural unconscionability relates to the specific 
conditions surrounding the formation of the contract. This may include the par-
ties’ relative bargaining positions, any vulnerability of the weaker party (for ex-
ample, age, experience, and mental capacity), and any dishonest or otherwise 
improper conduct that may have influenced the weaker party to enter the con-
tract.62 In other words, procedural unconscionability is based on a defective or 
unfair contracting process that presumably impaired the weaker party’s freedom 
of choice.63 Substantive unconscionability, on the other hand, is based on the 
                                                                                                                           
of contract, see JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 9.39 & nn.1–15 (6th 
ed. 2009). 
58 RESTATEMENT OF THE L. ON CONSUMER CONTS. § 5 cmt. 1 (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft 
2019) (“[T]he doctrine of unconscionability is a primary tool against the inclusion of intolerable terms 
in the consumer contract.”); id. § 5 & cmts. 1–5; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 208 
cmt. a (“Particularly in the case of standardized agreements, the rule of this Section permits the court 
to pass directly on the unconscionability of the contract or clause rather than to avoid unconscionable 
results by interpretation.”). 
59 See U.C.C. § 2-302(1). The literature on unconscionability is vast. See generally M.P. Elling-
haus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969) (defending the doctrine of uncon-
scionability as a useful legal standard); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The 
Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967) (discussing the drafting of the unconscionabil-
ity clause of the UCC); Colleen McCullough, Comment, Unconscionability as a Coherent Legal Con-
cept, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 779 (2016) (examining developments in the doctrine of unconscionability in 
the context of contracts of adhesion). 
60 See, e.g., PERILLO, supra note 57, § 9.40 (“‘Unconscionable’ is a word that defies lawyer-like 
definition.” (footnote omitted)). 
61 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (“Un-
conscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part 
of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” 
(footnote omitted)); Trinity Indus., Inc., v. McKinnon Bridge Co.,77 S.W.3d 159, 170–71 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 2001) (stating that a finding of unconscionability “may arise from . . . (procedural unconsciona-
bility) or . . . (substantive unconscionability)”), abrogated by Bowen ex rel. Doe v. Arnold, 502 
S.W.3d 102 (Tenn. 2016). But see infra note 65 and accompanying text (noting that most jurisdictions 
require both procedural and substantive unconscionability to invalidate a contract clause as uncon-
scionable). 
62 See, e.g., Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915, 921 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002) 
(“[P]rocedural unconscionability . . . can include a variety of inadequacies, such as age, literacy, lack 
of sophistication, hidden or unduly complex contract terms, bargaining tactics, and the particular set-
ting existing during the contract formation process.” (citations omitted)). 
63 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. 
REV. 1053, 1053 (1977) (“Nonsubstantive [procedural] unconscionability arises when certain factors, 
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problematic outcome of the contracting process, namely on the content of the 
agreement, or a clause therein, which is deemed unreasonably imbalanced.64 
Typically, a clause will be declared unenforceable when both procedural 
and substantive unconscionability are present, at least to a certain degree.65 The 
two elements are said to influence one another under a “sliding scale,” where 
less of one element requires more of the other, and vice versa.66 Importantly, 
courts will only intervene on the grounds of unconscionability if the combined 
effect of the substantive and procedural elements is so extreme as to “shock the 
conscience of the court.”67 On its face, many consumer contracts contain voida-
ble terms that may, upon judicial inspection, justify nullification. Nevertheless, 
and as Part II.C. illustrates, consumers’ ability to rely on the unconscionability 
doctrine to challenge one-sided standard terms is greatly limited. 68 
3. Unfair Terms 
Under American law, the label “unfair term” is seldom applied to denote a 
distinct formal rule or doctrine.69 Federal and state legislators have traditionally 
refrained from embracing “unfair terms” legislation, which today has become 
quite common in jurisdictions outside the United States.70 Of course, any uncon-
                                                                                                                           
such as a lack of commercial sophistication, apparently prevent a contracting party from exercising his 
freedom to choose the terms of an agreement.”). 
64 See, e.g., Sitogum Holdings, 800 A.2d at 921. 
65 For a clear reflection of this dominant approach, see RESTATEMENT OF THE L. ON CONSUMER 
CONTS. § 5(b) (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft 2019). It is also supported by federal and state case law. 
See, e.g., Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 2002); Williams, 350 
F.2d at 449; Marin Storage & Trucking, Inc., v. Benco Contracting & Eng’g, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 
653 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918, 922–23 (N.D. 
2005). Nevertheless, under a competing approach, either substantive or procedural unconscionability 
standing alone may be sufficient. For a recent empirical study reporting on such “single-element” 
cases, see Brian M. McCall, Demystifying Unconscionability: A Historical and Empirical Analysis, 65 
VILL. L. REV. 773, 814 (2020) (finding that almost a third of all successful claims did not require 
proof of both elements). 
66 See, e.g., Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale 
Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 12 (2012). 
67 See, e.g., Leeber v. Deltona Corp., 546 A.2d 452, 454, 456 (Me. 1988) (internal quotations 
omitted) (“A determination of unconscionability cannot be made unless the circumstances of the case 
truly ‘shock the conscience’ of the court.” (citations omitted)). 
68 See discussion infra Section II.C. (assessing the disadvantages of relying on judicial scrutiny to 
remedy exploitative consumer contract terms).  
69 Only a handful of state and federal laws involve statutory prohibitions or restrictions relating to 
“unfair terms” or “unfair provisions.” See, e.g., California Rental-Purchase Act, CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 1812.621 (West 2021) (mentioning that the Legislature’s intent was to prohibit unfair conduct tar-
geting consumers in rental-purchase transactions); Securities Act of 1951, N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-
08.1 (2021) (providing that “[t]he right to sell securities in this state shall not be granted in any case 
when it appears to the commissioner that . . . the proposed disposal of the securities is on unfair terms 
. . . .”). 
70 For further discussion, see infra Subsection II.B.1. 
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scionability case may involve some elements of unfairness—substantive or pro-
cedural.71 It is thus unsurprising that the label “unfair” is often used as a syno-
nym for “unconscionable.”72 Nevertheless, “fairness” or “unfairness” are not per 
se formal elements of the unconscionability doctrine. As a result, rigorous analy-
sis of the concept of fairness in the context of unfair standard terms is lacking in 
American scholarship and case law.73 
As a starting point,74 we employ below the notion of unfair terms to denote 
a standard term in a consumer contract that fulfills the following three condi-
tions: 
1) The term addresses a non-salient feature of the transaction, and is thus 
presumably non-transparent to the average consumer; 
2) The term deprives the consumer of a pre-existing right or a reasonable 
expectation that the average consumer would have in a transaction of such a 
kind; and 
3) The term, if applied, might result in serious harm or loss to consumers 
that cannot easily be avoided and that is not outweighed by any benefit the aver-
age consumer may obtain from the transaction. 
In our view, there seems to be, at least prima facie, no reason to grant legal 
immunity to exploitative terms that fall under the definition of an unfair term.75 
If anything, the massive use of exploitative terms justifies public scrutiny and 
control even when exploitative terms are not, strictly speaking, legally invalid ab 
initio or judicially voidable under the requirements of the unconscionability doc-
trine. To see why this is the case, Section C discusses the social costs that exploi-
tative boilerplate entails. 
                                                                                                                           
71 Cf. supra notes 61–66 and accompanying text (discussing the interplay between substantive 
and procedural unconscionability). 
72 Alternatively, “unfair” is often used as an adjective describing the nature of a certain uncon-
scionable term (or contract). In the majority of federal and state contract disputes concerning “unfair 
terms,” courts also discuss or use the term “unconscionability.” See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. 
Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010); Moore v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 351 F. Supp. 3d 76 (D.D.C. 2019); Triple 
7 Commodities, Inc. v. High Country Mining, Inc., 857 S.E.2d 403 (W. Va. 2021). 
73 Nevertheless, the concept of fairness is sometimes analyzed in the context of UDAP laws. See 
generally Emily Beale, Comment, Unfair-but-Not-Deceptive: Confronting the Ambiguity in Washing-
ton State’s Consumer Protection Act, 43 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1011 (2020) (discussing ambiguity in 
the concept of unfairness related to the Washington Consumer Protection Act). For a discussion of the 
issue in European scholarship, see, for example, HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 256–86 
(1999); Spencer Nathan Thal, The Inequality of Bargaining Power Doctrine: The Problem of Defining 
Contractual Unfairness, 8 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 17, 21–22 (1988). 
74 This proposed definition overlaps, to a considerable extent, with the definition of “unfairness” 
under the Federal Trade Commission Act. See infra note 272 and accompanying text. 
75 It should be noted here that the case for administrative oversight over unfair boilerplate does 
not depend on adopting a particular concept of fairness. This, of course, does not absolve the pertinent 
agencies from addressing this thorny issue. Section III.C outlines a few alternative approaches that 
administrative agencies can take when designing their enforcement policies and priorities in this area. 
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C. The Social Costs of Exploitative Boilerplate 
The harm caused by exploitative terms has a unique factor that makes its 
analysis and conceptualization more challenging than that of losses and damages 
resulting from ordinary legal wrongs. The harm resulting from an exploitative 
term emanates from conduct that, on first impression, seems lawful and which 
often is indeed legally valid (unless and until invalidated by a court). Such harm 
results from firms and consumers operating based on what prima facie seems to 
be a legally binding contractual provision.76 As a result, a consumer may face 
systematic hurdles in making a complaint about losses emanating from being 
subject to a contract presumably entered into freely. This presents a serious ob-
stacle for consumers because the insertion of unfair, unconscionable, or even 
legally invalid terms into a consumer contract is not recognized as a legal 
wrong.77 
Nonetheless, the costs to consumers and society of boilerplate exploitation 
are very real. The direct and immediate victims are the affected consumers that 
abide by legally invalid, substantially unconscionable, or otherwise unfair terms. 
To illustrate, assume an exemption (or exculpatory) clause limiting the liability 
of a firm offering property inspection services for any kind of negligence on its 
part to $285. Such a term can be exploitative if it leaves a substantial portion of 
the foreseeable loss that can be caused by the firm’s negligence uncompensated. 
Although such a term could theoretically translate to consumers paying lower 
prices for the service provided, it is more likely to reflect the firm’s ability to 
impose one-sided non-salient terms without making any concessions.78 The ex-
ploitation, in this case, manifests itself in making the consumer waive their basic 
legal right—and reasonable expectation—to fair compensation for a wrong suf-
fered.79 
                                                                                                                           
76 As previously discussed, this factor has a strong psychological impact on consumers. See supra 
notes 39–50 and accompanying text. 
77 Another conceptual obstacle might be posed by the avoidable consequences doctrine (also 
known as the mitigation of damages doctrine) or the comparative/contributory negligence defense, 
which deny or reduce recovery for avoidable losses. See, e.g., Yehuda Adar, Comparative Negligence 
and Mitigation of Damages: Two Sister Doctrines in Search of Reunion, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 783, 
783–84 (2013). Hence, consumers could be accused of failing to mitigate their losses (or contributing 
to them) by deciding to enter into the consumer contract without carefully reading the contract or 
resorting to legal consultation beforehand. 
78 Cf. Glassford v. BrickKicker, 35 A.3d 1044, 1046 (Vt. 2011) (finding a clause limiting a prop-
erty inspector’s liability in damages to $285 to be substantially unconscionable for similar reasons). 
One may argue that a higher limit would result in higher prices and that consumers can purchase in-
surance against such loss. Yet, it would be reasonable to assume in these cases that consumers are 
unaware of such terms, do not know how to value them properly, and that firms are better positioned 
to purchase such insurance. 
79 For useful analyses of the problems associated with exculpatory clauses, see, for example, 
Stolle & Slain, supra note 7, at 91 (finding that exculpatory clauses deterred a study’s participants 
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The typical loss to consumers from exploitative terms is economic, as in the 
example just mentioned. Nevertheless, exploitative terms may often harm im-
portant consumer interests that are not purely financial. For example, the inabil-
ity to fully recover for an injury or an expense that was unjustly imposed on the 
consumer may lead to feelings of frustration, anger, alienation, bitterness, and 
other forms of mental distress or inconvenience. In some cases, it may even re-
sult in the consumer being unable to obtain compensation for a serious personal 
injury or a property loss that the seller or supplier inflicted.80 
Another noteworthy category of intangible harms arises from terms that 
unduly restrict consumers’ access to justice. A classic example here is forum 
choice provisions that oblige consumers to litigate any future dispute in a geo-
graphically remote location (usually the other party’s locus), thus making litiga-
tion inconvenient or practically impossible for the consumer.81 Other typical ex-
amples include restrictions on consumers’ ability to raise certain claims during 
litigation,82 unfair arbitration clauses,83 and indemnity clauses that make con-
sumers liable for challenging such restrictions, particularly when done via class 
                                                                                                                           
from seeking compensation); Eike von Hippel, The Control of Exemption Clauses: A Comparative 
Study, 16 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 591, 592 (1967) (claiming that exculpatory clauses “change the 
general and normal allocation of risks between the parties, as it has been worked out by the courts and 
the legislatures, in favour of one party”); Vernie Edward Freeman II, Casenote, Property—Landlord 
and Tenant—Exculpatory Clause in Residential Apartment Lease Held Void as “Unbargained For.” 
Lloyd v. Service Corp., 453 So.2d 735 (Ala. 1984)., 15 CUMB. L. REV. 765, 765–67 (1985) (discuss-
ing a Supreme Court of Alabama case that declared an exculpatory clause void, inter alia, because it 
appeared in a standard form lease agreement). 
80 See, e.g., Jordan v. Diamond Equip. & Supply Co., 207 S.W.3d 525, 528, 535–36 (Ark. 2005) 
(upholding a sweeping exculpatory clause notwithstanding serious and permanent personal injury that 
allegedly resulted from negligent instructions regarding the use of a bobcat truck loader). For analysis 
and critique of the decision, see generally John G. Shram, Note, Contract Law—The Collision of Tort 
and Contract Law: Validity and Enforceability of Exculpatory Clauses in Arkansas. Jordan v. Dia-
mond Equipment, 2005 WL 984513 (2005)., 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 279 (2006). See also 
Harper v. Ultimo, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 418, 421–22, 427 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding a limitation clause con-
tained in an arbitration agreement unenforceable because it prevented a consumer from obtaining 
meaningful compensation for property damage caused by a contractor). 
81 See, e.g., Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Shute v. Carnival 
Cruise Lines reflects the judicial debate over the validity of forum selection clauses in consumer con-
tracts. 897 F.2d 377, 387–89 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 
(1991). For cases where such terms have been invalidated, see, for example, Brower v. Gateway 2000, 
Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574–75 (App. Div. 1998) and Dix v. ICT Grp., 106 P.3d 841, 843–45 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2005). 
82 See, e.g., Jordan, 207 S.W.3d at 528 (upholding a clause that waived the right to raise certain 
claims of negligence). 
83 Although arbitration clauses are not per se unconscionable, some arbitration clauses may be 
considered unduly imbalanced and thus unenforceable. See Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbi-
tration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 700–720; see also Feeney v. Dell Inc., 908 N.E.2d 753, 
763–64 (Mass. 2009) (prioritizing class actions over a contractual provision that required individual 
arbitration and prohibiting class actions), abrogated in part by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
563 U.S. 333 (2011) (pertaining to the holding only as applied to FAA arbitration agreements). 
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actions.84 Consumers may experience a sense of repression arising from the de-
nial of the basic right to have one’s day in court, to voice one’s complaints in 
front of an impartial public official, and to obtain a fair remedy for one’s griev-
ance.85 
As a final example, consider contract provisions that prohibit consumers 
from, or penalize them for, posting negative reviews online.86 Such terms may—
in addition to depriving consumers of fundamental rights (for example, freedom 
of expression)—harm consumers as a distinct class or group. Such clauses si-
lence consumers, isolate them from one another, and prevent them from airing 
their disputes and opinions in the public sphere. These and similar limitations on 
free speech and the free flow of information disempower consumers and might 
also deprive them of their collective sense of community.87 
In addition to harming consumers as individuals and as a class, exploitative 
terms can harm society more generally by reducing overall social welfare. For 
example, terms that ban consumers from posting negative reviews online do not 
merely violate their freedoms. They also undercut the market’s ability to offer 
accurate and reliable information, which is crucial for a flourishing economy.88 
Furthermore, exploitative fine print can increase consumer distrust and thus in-
flate transaction costs for consumers. It may even result in certain consumers 
refraining from entering into economically beneficial transactions for fear of 
harmful terms.89 
                                                                                                                           
84 See, e.g., Lennar Homes of Cal., Inc. v. Stephens, 181 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638, 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2014) (holding an indemnity clause interacting with the anti-strategic lawsuit against public participa-
tion statute in California to be unconscionable); Util. Serv. & Maint., Inc. v. Noranda Aluminum, Inc., 
163 S.W.3d 910, 913 (Mo. 2005) (en banc) (emphasizing that indemnity clauses must be clear and 
conspicuous in consumer contexts). 
85 This is also known as the concept of “procedural justice,” wherein parties often care more 
about the process of justice and having their day in court than the legal “bottom line.” See JOHN M. 
CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL 
DISCOURSE 127–30 (1990). 
86 See, e.g., Complaint at 1, Palmer v. KlearGear.com, No. 13-cv-00175 (D. Utah filed Dec. 18, 
2013) (detailing a consumer’s suit against an online retailer that threatened to fine them $3,500 over a 
negative online review and report them to credit agencies—and thus harm their creditworthiness). See 
infra notes 143–144 and accompanying text (explaining that such terms are now prohibited). 
87 See generally Hila Keren, Divided and Conquered: The Neoliberal Roots and Emotional Con-
sequences of the Arbitration Revolution, 72 FLA. L. REV. 575 (2020) (identifying the emotional harm 
of mandated arbitration on consumers). 
88 See infra notes 103–106 and accompanying text (discussing the role of information in consum-
er markets). 
89 See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 14, at 217 (“A generalized awareness [by consum-
ers] of the prospect of advantage-taking may lead buyers to avoid certain transactions (thereby reduc-
ing their well-being as they forgo otherwise valuable opportunities), to expend additional resources on 
investigation (a costly process that directly reduces well-being), or simply to lump it (in which case 
they will enter into contracts that are not value maximizing).” (footnote omitted)). 
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From a non-consequentialist perspective, one may argue that, under the 
guise of the free market and individual autonomy, firms govern over important 
legal and economic aspects in the lives of millions of consumers in a non-
democratic manner through their boilerplate language.90 Indeed, many believe 
that in an era of mass production and under the stress of high competition be-
tween firms, the use of exploitative terms has become virtually inevitable.91 
This, some argue, presents a challenge to important social values such as democ-
racy and meaningful freedom of contract.92 Along these lines, it has been argued 
that exploitative terms dilute, or even “delete” consumers’ rights.93 In permitting 
such a massive “deletion of rights” without sufficient public oversight, our socie-
ty implicitly renounces its commitment to the “rule of law,” replacing it with the 
“rule of the firm.”94 Arguably, such tolerance on the part of the law toward busi-
ness opportunism may reinforce feelings of distrust, inequality, resentment, and 
antipathy within the civil society.95 This state of affairs is morally disturbing and 
socially harmful.96 
                                                                                                                           
90 For an early observation along these lines, see, for example, Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price 
Contract?—An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 731 (1931) (“Law, under the drafting skill of 
counsel, now turns out a form of contract which resolves all questions in advance in favor of one party 
to the bargain. It is a form of contract which . . . amounts to the exercise of unofficial government of 
some by others, via private law.”). See also RADIN, supra note 1, at 33 (“When a firm’s mass-market 
boilerplate withdraws a number of important recipients’ rights—such as rights of redress granted by 
the state . . . it is displacing the legal regime enacted by the state with a governance scheme that is 
more favorable to the firm.”). 
91 See, e.g., Slawson, supra note 17, at 531 (“Forms standardized to achieve economies of mass 
production and mass merchandising will . . . almost certainly be unfair, because if they were not, their 
issuers would probably lose money. . . . Competitive pressures have worked so long and so thoroughly 
to make standard forms unfair that we no longer even notice the unfairness.”). 
92 See, e.g., id. at 530 (“[T]he overwhelming proportion of standard forms are not democratic be-
cause they are not, under any reasonable test, the agreement of the consumer . . . to whom they are 
delivered.”). 
93 For a thorough examination of the concept of consumer rights being diluted through exploita-
tive terms, see RADIN, supra note 1, at 16, 19–51, 82–119. 
94 Id. at 15 (“[W]e risk losing our claim to being a society observant of the rule of law when our 
courts permit too free a rein to boilerplate.”). 
95 See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 11, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (Nos. 18,604 & 18,605) (“Each time there is a substantial injustice in a court, there is 
in like degree a lessening of respect for the law, and the emotions of anger and hate directed towards 
those persons pursuing injustice, and general antipathy toward the community which permits a system 
of law capable of injustice to exist.”); Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the 
“Law of the Poor,” 102 GEO. L.J. 1383, 1415 (2014). 
96 Cf. Zamir, supra note 41, at 297 (“Legal norms may be important to instill commercial norms 
even if in most cases they are self-imposed by virtue of reputational forces.”). 
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II. EXISTING APPROACHES TO EXPLOITATIVE BOILERPLATE:  
A CRITICAL REVIEW 
Despite growing evidence and recognition of the vast and multi-faceted so-
cial costs of exploitative boilerplate, there is little consensus as to how this per-
sistent problem should be treated.97 This Part offers a critical examination of the 
mainstream approaches toward minimizing exploitation in consumer contracts. 
Section A criticizes the idea that market mechanisms alone can discipline firms 
and deter them from employing exploitative terms.98 Section B addresses sub-
stantive and procedural mandatory legislation that aims to minimize exploitation 
ex ante.99 Finally, Section C assesses ex post judicial scrutiny.100 
A. Market Self-Regulation: The Theory and Its Shortcomings 
Contracts allow parties to maximize their utility and thus increase overall 
social welfare.101 Economists generally opine that governments should limit 
their interventions to market failures that can be addressed cost-effectively.102 
Below we examine the key market failures pertaining to consumer contracts and 
investigate the market’s capacity to correct them without legal intervention. 
Consumer markets are characterized by asymmetric information.103 Alt-
hough sellers are generally well-informed about the quality and other traits of the 
                                                                                                                           
97 This has been the case in other consumer law contexts too. For a similar argument regarding the 
problems pertaining to mandatory disclosure regimes, see Robin Bradley Kar, The Emerging New Life 
of Contract Law Studies 101, 109 (Oct. 11, 2014) (reviewing OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEI-
DER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014)), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2508719 [https://perma.cc/E87X-BCAZ] (“[D]espite this 
increase in knowledge and emerging consensus over the problem [relating to mandated disclosures], 
there is even more uncertainty and even less consensus over how consumer protection should be re-
formed in light of these facts.”). 
98 See infra notes 101–135 and accompanying text. 
99 See infra notes 136–172 and accompanying text. 
100 See infra notes 173–198 and accompanying text. 
101 This proposition is often attributed to ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND 
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (New York, Modern Library 2000) (1776). See also Terence 
Hutchison, Adam Smith and The Wealth of Nations, 19 J.L. & ECON. 507, 517 (1976). 
102 For the general argument that governments should not interfere in markets and that central 
planning is bound to fail and erode freedom and liberal values, see generally F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD 
TO SERFDOM (1944). 
103 See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488, 490–91 (1970) (modeling information asymmetry through the 
example of the automobile market); Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 16, at 655–56 (developing criteria 
to assess when imperfect information should be regarded as resulting in a market failure that justifies 
regulation). See generally Carl Shapiro, Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller Reputa-
tion, 13 BELL J. ECON. 20 (1982) (analyzing consumers’ imperfect information with respect to unob-
servable product tributes and the limited impact of reputation). On the effect of imperfect consumer 
information on the market price under a monopoly, see generally Steven Salop & Joseph Stiglitz, 
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products and services they sell, consumers lack important information. This in-
formational disparity is not limited to the quality of the products and services 
sold; it extends to the non-negotiated terms of the consumer deal and especially 
to those “non-salient” terms that go unnoticed by the vast majority of consum-
ers.104 This, in turn, can lead to a market of so-called “lemons,” where firms of-
fer low-quality products—or disadvantageous contracts—to consumers.105 That 
is, sellers will take advantage of consumers’ ignorance and offer biased terms 
that most consumers would not have accepted under conditions of full infor-
mation—thus reducing, rather than enhancing, aggregate welfare.106 
Early law and economics commentators suggested that an informed group 
of consumers could correct such a market failure. According to this argument, an 
informed minority can adequately discipline sellers in a competitive market.107 
Firms, who compete over consumers and cannot afford to lose the informed 
groups, will be deterred from using biased and inefficient terms.108 The reading 
minority would exert pressure on sellers, thus improving market equilibrium for 
all consumers.109 
                                                                                                                           
Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersion, 44 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 493 (1977). 
104 See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text; see also Becher, supra note 7, at 733 (“Lack of 
familiarity with contractual terms is a specific category of asymmetric information.”). 
105 See, e.g., Akerlof, supra note 103, at 490 (“[B]ad cars drive out the good because they sell at 
the same price as good cars . . . . [T]he bad cars sell at the same price as good cars since it is impossi-
ble for a buyer to tell the difference between a good and a bad car; only the seller knows.”). 
106 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 16, at 829, 834–35 (recognizing the phenomenon of 
one-sided inefficient terms in consumer contracts due to information asymmetry and discussing a 
possible economic justification for their existence); Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded At-
tributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 
505, 505 (2006) (noting that “informational shrouding flourishes even in highly competitive markets,” 
even when it results in inefficient allocations); Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form 
Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 603–08 (1990) (discussing 
the detrimental economic effect of imperfect information on sellers’ and consumers’ behavior); Alan 
Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of 
Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1389 (1983) (distinguishing between three 
sources of asymmetric information in consumer contracts, of which ignorance as to contract quality is 
one). 
107 See M.J. Trebilcock & D.N. Dewees, Judicial Control of Standard Form Contracts, in THE 
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 93, 105–06 (Paul Burrows & Cento G. Veljanovski eds., 1981); see 
also Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 16, at 682 (“[W]hen markets are competitive, individuals are pro-
tected from the adverse consequences of making decisions in the face of imperfect information.”); id. 
at 637–38 (explaining the circumstances under which market competition over the researching shop-
pers will also protect the non-researching shoppers). 
108 See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 16, at 638; see also Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Pa-
ternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Une-
qual Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 616 (1982) (“If there is competition among sellers, and 
good information about buyer preferences, sellers will offer whatever terms they think buyers will pay 
for.”). 
109 See Kennedy, supra note 108, at 616; Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 16, at 638. 
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Nevertheless, theory and practice have refuted the informed minority the-
sis.110 To begin, many terms are obscure, unreadable, and incomprehensible.111 A 
significant minority is unlikely to read and understand such fine print.112 Fur-
thermore, due to the relatively small amounts of money typically involved in 
many consumer transactions, consumers are unlikely to hire lawyers to assist 
them in this process. In addition, in many markets—such as insurance, banking, 
and rental cars—firms offer a quite similar set of terms.113 Thus, consumers can-
not effectively shop among competitors’ contract terms, a factor that makes them 
even less inclined to invest in term reading.114 Hence, although they may search 
and compare salient aspects of the transaction,115 consumers are unlikely to 
make the same effort concerning the non-salient terms.116 In any case, firms can 
easily mitigate the influence of the informed minority. They need only offer the 
more informed consumers better terms and treatment, thus neutralizing the mi-
nority’s potential effect on the market for terms.117 
                                                                                                                           
110 The model has been questioned and criticized from various perspectives and in different con-
texts. See, e.g., Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the 
Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215, 290 (1990) (“The only circumstance in which the 
group of informed buyers would not unravel is where a nontrivial proportion of buyers faced no posi-
tive cost in becoming informed.”); see also Meyerson, supra note 106, at 601 (“[T]here generally will 
be too few informed consumers to produce a competitive market for contract terms.”). See generally 
Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liabil-
ity, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683 (1993) (criticizing reliance on competitive markets in the context of prod-
ucts liability); R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of an Informed 
Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635 (1996) (favoring market solu-
tions over legal intervention, but nonetheless criticizing reliance on an informed minority of consum-
ers).  
111 See, e.g., Benoliel & Becher, supra note 18, at 2283–84 (discussing empirical evidence 
demonstrating how consumers will often encounter unreadable terms). 
112 See, e.g., Croley & Hanson, supra note 110, at 771 (“Consumers must do more than read the 
words in a warranty; they must know what the words mean . . . . [T]he fact that the costs of reading a 
warranty or warning are low does not necessarily mean that the costs of becoming well informed also 
will be low.”); Meyerson, supra note 106, at 599 (“Without legal advice, consumers cannot under-
stand how typical contract terms shift risks away from the seller and onto the consumer.”). 
113 See, e.g., Meyerson, supra note 106, at 600; Slawson, supra note 17, at 531. 
114 See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 32, at 632; Slawson, supra note 17, at 530–31. 
115 See, e.g., Patricia M. Danzon, Comments on Landes and Posner: A Positive Economic Analy-
sis of Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 569, 571–73 (1985); Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended 
Revolution in Product Liability Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2193, 2204 (1989); Alan Schwartz, The 
Case Against Strict Liability, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 819, 826 (1992). 
116 See, e.g., Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Fo-
rum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 719 (1992) (“Although purchasers 
may frequently investigate and compare prices, the far greater cost involved in searching for and ob-
taining subordinate terms suggests that few markets will maintain the ‘core’ of informed shoppers 
necessary to protect the uninformed majority.” (footnote omitted)); Meyerson, supra note 106, at 601; 
Rakoff, supra note 13, at 1226 (“[F]or most consumer transactions, the close reading and comparison 
needed to make an intelligent choice among alternative forms seems grossly arduous.”). 
117 See, e.g., Cruz & Hinck, supra note 110, at 672–74. 
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Perhaps most importantly, empirical findings refute the informed minority 
thesis. Studies prove that the percentage of consumers who spend time examin-
ing the terms and conditions of their standard contracts prior to accepting them is 
negligible. According to one study, only a minuscule portion of consumers 
spends time reading online standard form contracts.118 Another study has shown 
that consumers are rarely aware of the fact that they have acceded to an arbitra-
tion clause, thus having waived their right to a trial in front of a court or jury.119 
More anecdotally, sellers and agents often admit that consumers very rarely read 
their contracts.120 Thus, even if, in theory, an informed minority could discipline 
the market, there are simply not enough informed consumers to attain that 
goal.121 
Furthermore, consumers (including sophisticated ones) suffer from various 
cognitive biases. Consumers are likely to exhibit unrealistic optimism, misper-
ceive small risks, commit to sunk cost, suffer from information overload, and 
yield to social norms of signing form contracts as presented and abiding by the 
fine print.122 Even ignoring all of these biases, consumers are simply unable to 
                                                                                                                           
118 See Bakos et al., supra note 34, at 4 (“[T]he fraction of consumers who read such [software li-
cense] contracts is so small that it is unlikely that an informed minority alone is shaping software 
license terms.”); see also Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, The Law of Standard Form Con-
tracts: Misguided Intuitions and Suggestions for Reconstruction, 8 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 199, 
199 (2010) (reporting on the finding of surveys which “do not support the assumption found in some 
literature that a substantial minority of consumers read their contracts and thus might discipline 
sellers”); Sovern, supra note 34, at 4 (finding among a survey of consumer law professors that less 
than one in six respondents normally read contracts or disclosures). 
119 Jeff Sovern et al., “Whimsy Little Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical 
Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015) (report-
ing survey results that “suggest a profound lack of understanding about the existence and effect of 
arbitration agreements among consumers”). 
120 See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-
Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 842 n.31 (2006) (noting a business whose “licens-
ing agreement promised a ‘consideration’ to anyone who read their terms and sent an email to an 
address listed in the agreement”). Only after “four months and more than 3,000 downloads” did a 
consumer respond with an email. Id. For yet another illustrative story, see Planet Money, Summer 
School 8: Risk & Disaster, NPR, at 10:45 (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/08/26/906243873/
summer-school-8-risk-disaster [https://perma.cc/3GJE-Y4BM] (recording an insurance agent’s opin-
ion that, in the course of six years, only three people, out of thousands of customers, read the insur-
ance fine print—or part of it—and raised any issues with it). 
121 See, e.g., Zamir, supra note 41, at 296 (“For all practical purposes, . . . the informed-minority 
hypothesis may be disregarded, at least in routine transactions.” (footnote omitted)). 
122 See, e.g., Bar-Gill, supra note 13, at 1375–76; Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 213–25; Hillman & 
Rachlinski, supra note 33, at 450–54; Korobkin, supra note 8, at 1290–93; Debra Pogrund Stark & 
Jessica M. Choplin, A Cognitive and Social Psychological Analysis of Disclosure Laws and Call for 
Mortgage Counseling to Prevent Predatory Lending, 16 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 85, 96–105 (2010) 
(discussing fourteen cognitive and social psychological barriers that prevent disclosures in the mort-
gage market from being effective); see also supra notes 39–50 and accompanying text (discussing 
certain psychological factors that drive consumers to accept the harm caused by sellers’ inclusion of 
invalid, unenforceable terms in their boilerplate contracts). 
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rationally assess the likelihood that the seller will indeed rely upon a one-sided 
term and, in that event, to assess the likelihood that they will be able to success-
fully negotiate the issue with the firm or challenge the term before a court or an 
arbitrator.123 Simply put, behavioral biases and natural limitations on consumers’ 
capacity prevent them from properly assessing the risks latent in one-sided boil-
erplate. 
One could still argue that information flows may nonetheless assist con-
sumers in disciplining markets. Following this logic, by posting their negative 
experiences online, the more sophisticated aggrieved consumers can inform and 
protect many others. This, in turn, enhances the potential reputational harm to 
firms that employ exploitative terms.124 In the era of unprecedented online in-
formation flows, the argument goes, word of mouth could adequately deter and 
discipline sellers who care about their reputation.125 
Although theoretically appealing, this argument has its faulty assumptions 
and shortcomings. The information that sophisticated consumers acquire after a 
costly investigation into the quality and value of a form contract is a public 
good.126 As such, and given the notorious free-rider problem, there would be 
little incentive for the minority to share with the uninformed majority their valu-
able information because that information is the leverage with which they could 
extract a discount from sellers.127 Furthermore, there are good reasons to believe 
that those consumers who share their experiences online might not represent the 
general pool of consumers, and that reputational information may be slow to 
develop, seriously distorted, and inaccurate.128 Moreover, as before, firms will 
have a profit incentive to identify these consumers and address their issues sepa-
rately and discreetly, while ignoring the weaker, less assertive, and less sophisti-
                                                                                                                           
123 Cf. Zamir, supra note 41, at 299. 
124 See Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Contracting 
in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMMS. & TECH. L. REV. 303, 315–18 
(2008). 
125 For the disciplinary role of reputation in the context of standard form contracts, see, for exam-
ple, Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 16, at 830. See also Oren Bar-Gill, Consumer Transactions, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 406, 409–11 (Eyal Zamir & 
Doron Teichman eds., 2014) (ebook) (discussing market solutions and reviewing the role of reputa-
tion). 
126 See, e.g., Yonathan A. Arbel, Reputation Failure: The Limits of Market Discipline in Consum-
er Markets, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1239, 1242 & n.7 (2019). 
127 Cf. Cruz & Hinck, supra note 110, at 668–69, 669 (“[A]ll buyers would prefer that an in-
formed minority existed . . . but none [would] want to incur the cost . . . . If nobody else does it, then 
the cost of becoming informed is simply a waste to the hapless buyer who does; and if enough other 
buyers do it, then it is more profitable not to read and to free ride off those who do.” (footnote omit-
ted)). 
128 See, e.g., Arbel, supra note 126, at 1243, 1262–70 (describing online reputational information 
as “sluggish” and overly reflective of unusual consumer experiences, leading to the information’s 
unreliability (emphasis omitted)). 
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cated consumers.129 Armed with big data and sophisticated analytics, there are 
reasonable grounds to assume that firms will find ways to defuse the impact of 
any particularly assertive, vocal, and informed consumers.130 
More generally, the argument that employing one-sided contracts will in-
evitably cause grievous injury to the seller’s reputation still awaits empirical 
proof.131 It is unlikely that the public will find the story of a consumer who has 
encountered an unfair term very interesting or exciting, absent extraordinary cir-
cumstances.132 Furthermore, if most firms in a market or industry use the same 
biased terms, the terms are more likely to become an accepted norm.133 
Considering the above, the assumption that reputational constraints alone 
will correct the failures of consumer markets seems rather speculative and un-
sounded. If anything, empirical findings indicate that the proof is in the pudding: 
non-salient standard terms are—and continue to be—frequently biased against 
consumers.134 Because market mechanisms cannot guarantee an efficient and 
fair equilibrium, legal intervention may be warranted to restrain exploitative 
boilerplate terms.135 
B. Legislative Intervention 
Market forces and reputational concerns do not guarantee efficient contract 
terms.136 Thus, legislatures have often been compelled to intervene to protect 
consumers from pre-drafted, non-negotiable exploitative terms. This Section 
critically discusses legislatures’ two typical responses to the problem of exploita-
tive boilerplate: first, substantive regulation of the content of the forms that firms 
                                                                                                                           
129 See, e.g., Becher & Zarsky, supra note 12, at 90; Amy J. Schmitz, Access to Consumer Reme-
dies in the Squeaky Wheel System, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 279, 280–81 (2012); Zamir, supra note 41, at 297. 
130 See, e.g., Yonathan A. Arbel & Roy Shapira, Theory of the Nudnik: The Future of Consumer 
Activism and What We Can Do to Stop It, 73 VAND. L. REV. 929, 959–71 (2020) (describing how 
firms leverage data and analytics to identify and subdue assertive consumers before the firm suffers 
any undesirable reputational or legal consequences). 
131 For an interesting related discussion, see generally Jeff Sovern, Six Scandals: Why We Need 
Consumer Protection Laws Instead of Just Markets, MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (St. John’s Legal Stud., Rsch. Paper No. 21-0001, 2021) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3765745 [https://perma.cc/D97T-Q5BK] (examining six occurrences in 
which companies’ misconduct became public but did not result in uniform reputational harm or di-
minished sales). 
132 See Becher & Zarsky, supra note 124, at 317 (“Stories of imbalanced contractual provisions 
rarely engage the mass media, which must tailor their content to meet a broad audience with a limited 
attention span in a very competitive setting.”). 
133 See Becher, supra note 7, at 751. 
134 See, e.g., Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 33, at 257 (reporting that terms in the end us-
er license agreements the authors studied became more favorable to sellers over time). 
135 We use the term “may” because there is still a need to engage in a cost-benefit or cost-
effectiveness analysis to ensure that the proposed intervention yields more benefit than harm. 
136 See supra Section II.A. 
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draft and offer consumers,137 and second, regulation of the procedure governing 
the formation of consumer contracts.138 
1. Substantive Regulation 
Substantive regulation of consumer contracts can be done either by invali-
dating specific types of clauses or by defining such terms as presumably unfair. 
U.S. legislatures have chosen this path only exceptionally, in particular areas that 
have been perceived as posing especially complex problems that necessitate 
public regulation and supervision. One established exception is the insurance 
industry, where mandatory laws subject many types of insurance contracts to 
comprehensive oversight by state and federal public authorities.139 Some bank-
ing contracts have also been subject to substantive scrutiny with respect to price-
fixing, privacy, and other issues.140 For example, under the Higher Education 
Opportunity Act, a private education lender is prohibited from incorporating “a 
fee or penalty on a borrower for early repayment or prepayment” into a standard 
form contract for “any private education loan.”141 Another important example is 
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, which safeguards minimum substantive 
standards of warranties concerning tangible consumer products.142 
Finally, a recent and less traditional example is the Consumer Review Fair-
ness Act of 2016.143 This Act, which is not limited to a specific industry or mar-
ket, prohibits firms from including terms in their standardized forms that threat-
en or penalize consumers for sharing and posting honest reviews.144 Some addi-
tional examples of mandatory substantive content regulation exist at the state 
                                                                                                                           
137 See infra notes 139–156 and accompanying text. 
138 See infra notes 157–172 and accompanying text. 
139 See, e.g., Tom Baker & Kyle D. Logue, Mandatory Rules and Default Rules in Insurance Con-
tracts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW 377, 402–08 (Daniel 
Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman eds., 2015) (discussing different forms of administrative control over insur-
ance policies); Spencer L. Kimball & Werner Pfennigstorf, Legislative and Judicial Control of the Terms 
of Insurance Contracts: A Comparative Study of American and European Practice, 39 IND. L.J. 675, 
681–704 (1964) (discussing legislative and judicial intervention into U.S. insurance policy terms). For an 
up-to-date survey of the key federal and state agencies overseeing the insurance market, see Federal 
Insurance Office (FIO), NAIC, https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_federal_insurance_office_fio.
htm [https://perma.cc/MYK4-XRXJ] (Aug. 25, 2021). 
140 For a general survey of financial consumer protection laws, see Patricia Born, Financial Con-
sumer Protection in the United States, in AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF FINANCIAL CONSUM-
ER PROTECTION 379, 387–94 (Tsai-Jyh Chen ed., 2018). 
141 Higher Education Opportunity Act § 1011(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1650(e). 
142 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312. 
143 Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 45b. 
144 For a detailed analysis of the Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, see generally Eric 
Goldman, Understanding the Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, 24 MICH. TELECOMMS. & 
TECH. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
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level.145 And yet, regulating the content of consumer contracts is widely per-
ceived in the United States as a strong, exceptional, and disfavored form of legal 
intervention.146 
Interestingly, this is in stark contrast to the legislative landscape in many 
other jurisdictions. For example, all state members of the European Union are 
subject to the Unfair Contract Terms Directive.147 The Directive provides a 
general definition for an unfair term.148 It also stipulates an indicative and non-
exhaustive list of seventeen terms that may be regarded as unfair toward con-
sumers.149 Other countries, such as Australia,150 Israel,151 New Zealand,152 and 
the United Kingdom,153 have taken a similar approach. 
Importantly, in certain jurisdictions, statutes specifically empower courts 
to strike down exploitative terms or modify them to remove their exploitative 
aspects.154 Some legislatures, such as those in Israel, New Zealand, Germany, 
Sweden, and Denmark, have also allowed consumer organizations or public 
                                                                                                                           
145 For instance, many states prohibit forum-fixing or forum-moving clauses and clauses that have 
a consumer waive a right of action against the creditor or seller. Furthermore, California has adopted 
lists of unconscionable terms for different consumer products. For example, the California Automo-
bile Sales Finance Act provides a list of six prohibited terms that may not be included in a conditional 
sale. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2983.7 (West 2021). 
146 For a useful summary of content-based contract regulation in the United States, see Zamir, su-
pra note 41, at 302, 309–10 (claiming that, although such regulation is less exceptional than often 
thought, it is “significantly less common in the United States than in many other countries” and that 
“U.S. law still largely addresses unfair clauses in [standard form contracts] through general, vague, 
and not very effective doctrines”). 
147 Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29. 
148 Id. art. 3(1), at 31 (defining unfair term in consumer contracts). 
149 Id. annex ¶ 1, at 33. For further analysis, see Colin Scott, Enforcing Consumer Protection 
Laws, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON INTERNATIONAL CONSUMER LAW 466, 474–76 (Geraint 
Howells et al. eds., 2d ed. 2018). 
150 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 (Austl.). The Australian Consumer Law 
(ACL) is set out in Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. Id. The ACL defines what 
constitutes an unfair term in a consumer contract. Id. s 24. It further details a non-exhaustive list of 
fourteen potentially unfair categories of terms. Id. s 25. 
151 See Standard Contracts Law, 5743–1982, LSI 37 6 (1982–83) (Isr.), https://www.nevo.co.il/
law_html/law150/laws%20of%20the%20state%20of%20israel-37.pdf [https://www.perma.cc/5VWY-
JTNX]. The statute provides a general definition of “unduly disadvantageous” terms and details sus-
pect and illegal terms. Id. §§ 3–5. For a succinct and updated summary of the Israeli law of standard 
form contracts, see Eyal Zamir & Tal Mendelson, Three Modes of Regulating Price Terms in Stand-
ard-Form Contracts—The Israeli Experience, in CONTROL OF PRICE-RELATED TERMS IN STANDARD 
FORM CONTRACTS 429, 433–37 (Yeşim M. Atamer & Pascal Pichonnaz eds., 2020). 
152 See Fair Trading Act 1986, s 46L (N.Z.) (providing a similar definition to the ACL); id. s 46M 
(detailing a list of terms that may be unfair). 
153 Consumer Rights Act, (2015) §§ 61–76, 9(2) HALS. STAT. (4th ed.) 1112, 1169–79 (Eng.). 
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 devotes sixteen provisions to “Unfair Terms.” Id. It provides that 
“[a]n unfair term of a consumer contract is not binding on the consumer.” Id. § 62(1), at 1169. Fur-
ther, it contains a list of no less than twenty terms that “may be regarded as unfair.” Id. § 63(1), at 
1170, sch. 2, at 1188–90. 
154 See, e.g., § 3, Standard Contracts Law (Isr.); Fair Trading Act 1986, s 26A (N.Z.). 
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agencies to directly apply to courts and litigate cases of unfair terms in the 
name of the public interest.155 
Nonetheless, as Part III contends, even a statutory regime that compre-
hensively addresses substantive unfairness—a regime that generally does not 
exist in the United States—requires supplementation by an administrative sys-
tem. Such a system would facilitate the need to implement, refine, and adapt 
the regime to the dynamic realities of the market.156 
2. Procedural Regulation 
Returning focus to the United States, state legislatures have quite often 
opted to regulate the procedural aspects of consumer transactions. One perva-
sive technique is disclosure. Mandated disclosures, which aim to directly tack-
le asymmetric information, have traditionally been considered less intrusive 
and more efficient than substantive content-based regulation.157 Ideally, disclo-
sures have two advantages: first, they can make important information availa-
ble to consumers, and second, they can ensure that the information is observa-
ble and easy to absorb. 
Various versions of mandatory disclosures have been adopted in the con-
text of consumer contracts. An important example is “Regulation Z,” enacted 
under the Truth in Lending Act.158 Regulation Z requires, inter alia, disclosure 
of “[t]he circumstances under which a finance charge may be imposed.”159 An-
other important regulation concerns the market for used vehicles. The Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) Used Motor Vehicle Trade Regulation Rule requires 
the use of a Buyer’s Guide form that states: “IMPORTANT: Spoken promises 
                                                                                                                           
155 See, e.g., § 16(a), Standard Contracts Law (Isr.) (“The Attorney-General or his representative, 
the Commissioner of Consumer Protection under the Consumer Protection Law, 5741–1981, any 
customers’ organisation and public authority designated by regulations, and a customers’ organisation 
approved by the Minister of Justice for a particular matter may apply . . . for the annulment of an un-
duly disadvantageous condition of a standard contract.” (footnote omitted)); Fair Trading Act 1986, 
s 46H(1) (N.Z.) (“The [Commerce] Commission may apply to the High Court or the District Court . . . 
for a declaration under section 46I that a term in a standard form consumer contract is an unfair con-
tract term.”). In Germany, consumer organizations, rather than administrative agencies, are vested 
with the power to bring suit in such matters. See Bates, supra note 25, at 56, 62–65. In certain Scandi-
navian countries, the public body that deals with unfair terms is the “Ombudsman.” See Ewoud H. 
Hondius, Unfair Contract Terms: New Control Systems, 26 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 525, 535–40 (1978). 
156 See discussion infra Part III. 
157 For a discussion of mandatory disclosure regimes and the relationship between procedural and 
substantive contract regulation, see COLLINS, supra note 73, at 279–86; Zamir, supra note 41, at 289–
302. 
158 See Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 80 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f); 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a) (2021). 
159 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a). 
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are difficult to enforce. Ask the dealer to put all promises in writing.”160 The 
rule thereby mandates car dealers to provide conspicuous and clear warnings to 
customers with whom they are negotiating a sale.161 
Warnings are another popular regulatory tool in the arsenal of policy-
makers. Here, the legislation can condition the enforceability of specific “sus-
pected” terms on the fulfillment of special formal duties by the drafting party, 
intended to highlight the risk involved in assenting to these terms. For exam-
ple, section 2-316 of the UCC requires warranty disclaimers to be made “con-
spicuous.”162 In the same vein, section 2-209 demands that contractual terms 
barring oral modification be “separately signed.”163 State legislatures have 
adopted similar rules in various contexts.164 Presumably, such measures can 
draw consumers’ attention to certain important contractual terms and thus in-
crease their salience and visibility—and the corresponding likelihood a con-
sumer will actually read them. 
Disclosures and warnings, however, are by no means a silver bullet. As 
currently deployed, they do not discipline consumer markets. Indeed, the lit-
erature has severely criticized both mandatory disclosures in general,165 and 
disclosure of imbalanced terms in consumer contracts in particular.166 To begin, 
firms can devise shrewd ways to divert consumers’ attention from the disclosed 
information.167 Even when this is not the case, making terms clear and conspicu-
                                                                                                                           
 160 16 C.F.R. § 455 figs.1, 2 (2020) (providing a form that encourages consumers to put agree-
ments resulting from negotiations with car dealers in writing). 
161 See id. § 455.2; see also id. § 455.1 (addressing the dealer’s obligation). 
162 U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (“[T]o exclude or modify the im-
plied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in 
case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the 
exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.”). 
163 Id. § 2-209(2) (“A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission except by a 
signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as between merchants such a 
requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be separately signed by the other party.”). 
164 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 647, 658 & nn.36–38 (2011) (“Undisclosed terms can be procedurally unconscionable 
. . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
165 See generally id. (positing that mandated disclosure regimes fail to protect consumers). For a 
more comprehensive presentation of the thesis, see generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEI-
DER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014). 
166 See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 120, at 849–50 (“Many commentators seem to have lost faith in 
disclosure as a remedy for market failures in standard-form contracting . . . .” (footnote omitted)); 
Zamir, supra note 41, at 297 (“[T]here is a growing recognition—including by some law-and-
economics scholars—that disclosure duties are often ineffective.” (footnote omitted)). 
167 See Todd Barlow & Michael S. Wogalter, Alcoholic Beverage Warnings in Magazine and Tel-
evision Advertisements, 20 J. CONSUMER RSCH. 147, 153–54 (1993); Howard Latin, “Good” Warn-
ings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1225–26 (1994); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1177 
(2003). See generally Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the “Right to Know” from 
the “Need to Know” About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REGUL. 293 (1994) (positing 
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ous will not improve consumers’ understanding if the disclosed or noticeable 
terms remain lengthy, complex, and unreadable—as is often the case.168 
Moreover, consumers can only process a limited amount of information. 
When consumers are bombarded with so much information, it is hard for them 
to locate and heed the important parts from within all of the disclosures and 
terms.169 Multiple disclosures and dense text can cause confusion, fatigue, 
mental distress, and information overload.170 Additionally, consumers are typi-
cally presented with disclosures at a late stage—namely, after they have essen-
tially made up their minds to enter the transaction. At this late stage, the dis-
closed information might not provide a sufficient force to counter consumers’ 
self-commitment.171 Finally, as mentioned earlier, the mere use of boilerplate 
induces consumers to feel obliged to comply with the written terms, all the 
more so if the terms were previously disclosed and clearly presented.172 At the 
end of the day, disclosures and warnings, as important as they may be in spe-
cific contexts, cannot be considered an effective overall solution to the prob-
lem of exploitative boilerplate. 
C. Judicial Scrutiny 
Courts have an important role to play in protecting consumers from ex-
ploitative terms. Alongside other concepts developed to protect weaker par-
                                                                                                                           
that warnings are counterproductive because they drive consumers to either ignore or overreact to 
product labels). 
168 For a discussion on the unreadability of consumer contracts, see Benoliel & Becher, supra 
note 18, at 2277–78; Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 33, at 253. See also supra notes 34–37 
and accompanying text (discussing consumers’ indifference and lack of incentive toward reading 
boilerplate contracts). 
169 See, e.g., BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 165, at 94–106. 
170 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 164, at 686–90, 690 (“Even if disclosees wanted to 
read all the disclosures relevant to their decisions, they could not do so proficiently, and practically 
they could not do so at all.”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Comment, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 
305, 310 (1986) (“Consumers faced with such text have found a very simple way to avoid information 
overload. They don’t load any information at all.” (footnote omitted)); Korobkin, supra note 8, at 
1225, 1225–27 (“[I]ncreased information load causes increased selectivity in the information pro-
cessed [by decisionmakers].” (footnote omitted)). 
171 A variety of behavioral factors may lead consumers to ignore the information at stake and car-
ry on with the transaction they decided to accept. See, e.g., Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and 
Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 125–35 (2007) (discussing possible exploi-
tations of consumer biases and psychology). 
172 For an interesting discussion of consumers’ perceived moral obligation to fulfill the terms of 
their contracts, see generally Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, The Common Sense of Con-
tract Formation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1269 (2015); Wilkinson-Ryan, Perverse Consequences, supra note 
12. 
2436 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:2405 
ties,173 unconscionability stands out as the most straightforward and thus valu-
able tool for tackling exploitative boilerplate terms.174 The flexibility of this 
legal concept allows courts to respond to a wide range of vulnerabilities under 
a variety of circumstances.175 Yet, too much reliance on this doctrine—or on 
the judicial system in general—to solve the problem of legally invalid or 
grossly unfair standard terms would be misguided and imprudent. This is be-
cause the cumulative effect of the doctrine’s entrenched features makes it too 
feeble to have a strong disciplining power on suppliers of exploitative terms.  
1. A Deficient Legislative Framework 
As mentioned above, the regulatory landscape lacks a systematic statutory 
framework addressing exploitative terms.176 This void limits the ability of 
courts to develop unconscionability as an effective regulatory check in two 
ways. First, the main statutory framework authorizing courts to intervene—
namely, the UCC—applies equally to negotiated and non-negotiated contract 
terms and to consumer and non-consumer (commercial) contracts alike.177 
Secondly, courts lack adequate guidance as to legislatures’ concepts of unfair-
ness, exploitation, or—for that matter—unconscionability. This greatly reduces 
the doctrine’s potential to efficiently address the unique problems associated 
with the use of exploitative fine print. 
2. Vagueness and Subjectivity 
As critics have long recognized, the concept of unconscionability is 
vague, obscure, and overly malleable. This makes its implementation in any 
given case unpredictable and, in the long run, inconsistent.178 This is far from 
surprising, given the great flexibility of the doctrine. Employing the doctrine 
                                                                                                                           
173 Examples of concepts developed to protect weaker bargaining parties include the doctrine of 
“unfair surprise,” the “reasonable expectation” test, and the “reasonably communicated” test. See, e.g., 
Becher, supra note 7, at 769 n.201. 
174 For a discussion on the unconscionability doctrine’s basic features, see supra Subsection I.B.2. 
175 See Becher, supra note 7, at 764–69 (discussing the potential of the unconscionability doctrine 
in these respects). 
176 See supra Subsection II.B.1. 
177 See U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). 
178 See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Frame-
work for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 15 (1981) (“Critics of flexible standards such 
as unconscionability have argued that the absence of specific guidance in such standards increases the 
potential for unreasoned or arbitrary decisions based on personal value judgments.” (footnote omit-
ted)); Slawson, supra note 17, at 564 (opining that the elements of the unconscionability doctrine may 
be “too numerous and complex to be workable in large numbers of contract cases”). But see generally 
McCall, supra note 65 (arguing that the outcomes of unconscionability cases are more predictable 
than is often presumed). 
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requires a subjective judicial assessment of the appropriate balance between 
the need to preserve free and stable markets and the desire to protect weaker 
contracting parties from exploitation.179 This subjectivity, which can hardly be 
avoided, undermines the extent to which the judicial system is capable of 
providing clear guidance as to what is unconscionable. 
3. Demanding Standards and Limited Precedential Value 
Another serious obstacle concerns the demanding standards for applying 
the doctrine and the limited precedential value of most unconscionability cas-
es. For starters, unconscionability is considered a legal defense rather than an 
independent cause of action. That is, it functions “as a shield, not a sword.”180 
In other words, consumers will typically invoke the alleged unconscionability 
of a term to evade liability (typically for breach of contract) or to challenge a 
seller’s attempt to evade liability based on a biased term, rather than to impose 
liability on the seller for offering the unfair term in the first place. 
On top of that, recall the demanding standards required for establishing 
unconscionability. First, because most courts require proof of both substantive 
and procedural unconscionability, even clearly oppressive terms are unlikely to 
be struck down absent procedural abuse—which is often hard to establish.181 
Second, a finding of unconscionability entails a high standard of oppressive-
ness, such as sufficient egregiousness so as to “shock the conscience of the 
court.”182 Practically speaking, this amounts to granting immunity to many 
unfair standard terms which, though troubling and exploitative, may not al-
ways meet this demanding threshold. Indeed, a recent comprehensive study 
has found that both the overall number of cases brought on the basis of the un-
                                                                                                                           
179 Becher, supra note 7, at 770–71. 
180 Super Glue Corp. v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 517 N.Y.S.2d 764, 766 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); see 
also Cowin Equip. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 734 F.2d 1581, 1582 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he cases 
which have addressed the issue have consistently rejected the theory that damages may be collected 
for an unconscionable contract provision . . . .”). Nonetheless, some have claimed that unconscionabil-
ity can and should serve as a basis for affirmative actions as well. See, e.g., Hazel Glenn Beh, Curing 
the Infirmities of the Unconscionability Doctrine, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1011, 1021–25 (2015); Harry G. 
Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 
459, 484–86, 545–48 (1995); Brady Williams, Unconscionability as a Sword: The Case for an Af-
firmative Cause of Action, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 2015, 2050–64 (2019); JAMES WHITE & ROBERT S. 
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 5-3, 5-8 (6th ed. 2010). 
181 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
182 See supra note 67 and accompanying text (quoting Leeber v. Deltona Corp., 546 A.2d 452, 
456 (Me. 1988)). 
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conscionability doctrine and the number of successful claims have greatly de-
clined in the last decade.183 
Furthermore, recall that procedural unconscionability is considered, under 
the prevalent approach, a necessary element of the doctrine. This means that a 
finding of unconscionability requires a careful factual examination of the spe-
cific circumstances surrounding the contract formation process with the partic-
ular consumer in the litigated case.184 Naturally, this feature increases the con-
sumer’s litigation costs and the expenditure of judicial resources.185 More sig-
nificantly, it reduces the precedential value of any judicial finding of uncon-
scionability. Future cases may be easily distinguishable from any previously 
decided case, if only by reference to a unique procedural factor that was pre-
sent or absent in one of the cases but not in the other. The limited precedential 
value of unconscionability cases makes it easier for firms to continue relying 
on an unfair term even after a court has concluded it is substantively uncon-
scionable. 
4. Institutional Limitations and Under-Deterrence 
Even if courts could apply the doctrine of unconscionability consistently, 
objectively, and frequently enough, firms would still likely not be deterred 
from incorporating exploitative terms into their standard forms. From the per-
spective of a rational form-drafter, the expected penalty for using a term that a 
court might declare unconscionable is relatively trivial. If worse comes to 
worst and the consumer’s defense is successful, the firm will only lose the abil-
ity to enforce the specific term or to rely on it in the specific case. Neverthe-
less, it will face no penalty, nor even liability in damages (or restitution), for 
using the unfair term in the first place or for attempting to rely on it.186 
Moreover, the ruling would not affect other contracts using the same 
form, and thereby the same unfair terms. Likewise, a court cannot ban the fu-
                                                                                                                           
183 See McCall, supra note 65, at 824 (finding that about three out of four unconscionability 
claims decided between 2013 and 2017 ultimately failed and that the number of claims based on the 
doctrine is declining). 
184 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) 
(“Whether a meaningful choice is present in a particular case can only be determined by consideration 
of all the circumstances surrounding the transaction.”). 
185 See, e.g., PERILLO, supra note 57, § 9.39 (noting that “[m]any cases have held that the provi-
sion mandates an evidentiary hearing or a full fledged trial on the merits” and opining that adopting 
such a conservative stance might make unconscionability “the primary dilatory defense in contract 
litigation”). 
186 Cf. discussion supra Subsection I.B.1 (reviewing consumer behavior and firm incentives re-
garding the inclusion of legally invalid terms in boilerplate forms). The only exception would be the 
risk of class action lawsuits to invalidate a particular term, which could have a significant impact. The 
current legal landscape, however, severely limits consumers’ ability to initiate class actions. See dis-
cussion infra Subsection II.C.5. 
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ture use of an exploitative term that was found to be substantively unconscion-
able. This limits the ability of judicial decisions to have a wider beneficial ef-
fect—whether on other customers of the same firm or other firms operating in 
similar markets. This greatly reduces the deterrent effect of the doctrine and 
leaves ample incentive for firms to continue employing exploitative terms of 
the same type.187 
5. Access to Justice 
Regardless of any of the frailties of the unconscionability doctrine, courts 
are simply unable to significantly reduce the widespread use of exploitative 
terms due to consumers’ limited access to justice. When consumers are subject 
to such terms, the most prevalent response appears to be no response at all. 
This is so because consumers face substantial hurdles to access justice. 
For starters, many consumers are unaware of their rights, which is a pre-
requisite for taking any legal action.188 Moreover, even if consumers can name 
the harm, they may still find it arduous to blame the counterparty, to make a 
claim, or to insist upon their rights.189 For instance, an FTC survey revealed 
that less than ten percent of defrauded consumers complained to “Official 
Sources” such as state-level consumer agencies, the FTC, or the Better Busi-
ness Bureau.190 Consumers may be intimidated by the prospect of confronting 
firms and may have difficulties accessing and funding legal counsel.191 Others 
may simply distrust the legal system and thus avoid resorting to it.192 
                                                                                                                           
187 See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan, Perverse Consequences, supra note 12, at 171 (“[O]ur current en-
forcement regime imposes no real costs to firms that overreach. . . . [I]f the worst thing that will hap-
pen is that the term will get thrown out, there is no reason not to include it and hope for the best.”). 
188 See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin E. Davis, (Mis)perceptions of Law in Consumer Mar-
kets, 19 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 245 (2017) (investigating the implications of consumers’ misperception 
of law from an economic perspective). 
189 See, e.g., William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Nam-
ing, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 631, 631 (1980–1981). 
190 See KEITH B. ANDERSON, CONSUMER FRAUD IN THE UNITED STATES: AN FTC SURVEY 80–81, 
80 tbl.5-1 (2004), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/consumer-fraud-united-
states-ftc-survey/040805confraudrpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VAL-6GSF].  
191 For detailed data on attorney’s fees, see RONALD L. BURDGE, UNITED STATES CONSUMER 
LAW: ATTORNEY FEE SURVEY REPORT 2017–2018, at 26 (2019), http://burdgelaw.com/wp-content/
uploads/2019/10/US-Consumer-Law-Attorney-Fee-Survey-Report-2017-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5V9K-3GCT] (“[T]he average hourly rate for the typical Consumer Law attorney in the United States 
is $345 . . . .”). In addition, firms may use manipulative strategies to distort consumers’ perception of 
the business-to-consumer relationships, so as to reduce consumers’ propensity to stand for their rights. 
See Shmuel I. Becher & Sarah Dadush, Relationship as Product: Transacting in the Age of Loneli-
ness, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 1597), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3590786 [https://perma.cc/SW23-Q6NZ]. 
192 See generally BENJAMIN H. BARTON, AMERICAN (DIS)TRUST OF THE JUDICIARY (2019), https://
iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/barton_american_distrust_of_the_judiciary.pdf 
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Furthermore, many consumer transactions involve relatively small amounts 
of money. This greatly reduces consumers’ incentive to confront sellers or to 
bring suit, which is especially true given the high expense involved in the liti-
gation process, even in the face of clear exploitation.193 
Relatedly, specific exploitative terms may directly undermine consumers’ 
access to justice. One example is terms that prohibit class actions—a mecha-
nism seemingly intended to overcome the small money disincentive and give 
consumers a stronger bargaining position as a group.194 Terms mandating arbi-
tration pose another significant obstacle.195 Likewise, forum selection and 
choice of law clauses make it harder—if not practically impossible—for con-
sumers to pursue their rights.196 Integrated clauses that bar oral or external evi-
                                                                                                                           
[https://perma.cc/854C-KVG5] (contextualizing recent declines in American trust of the judiciary 
within a history of cyclical distrust for U.S. courts since the nation’s founding); JAMES M. LYONS, 
TRUMP AND THE ATTACK ON THE RULE OF LAW (2019), https://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/
documents/publications/lyons_trump_and_the_attack_on_the_rule_of_law.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3SA9-FMDH] (discussing President Donald Trump’s role as a “centerpiece” in the modern-day deg-
radation of trust in the rule of law); CHASE T. ROGERS & STACY GUILLON, GIVING UP ON IMPARTIAL-
ITY: THE THREAT OF PUBLIC CAPITULATION TO CONTEMPORARY ATTACKS ON THE RULE OF LAW 
(2019), https://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/rogers-guillon_giving_up_on_
impartiality.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7MQ-AW9D] (opining that political sensationalism has skewed 
news media coverage and yielded distrust in the judiciary). 
193 Cf. Amy J. Schmitz, Enforcing Consumer and Capital Markets Law in the United States, in 
ENFORCING CONSUMER AND CAPITAL MARKET LAW: THE DIESEL EMISSIONS SCANDAL 339, 339–40 
(Beate Gsell & Thomas M.J. Möllers eds., 2020) (noting that class actions are especially relevant to 
“small dollar claims, where the cost to individually litigate is disproportionate to the eventual judg-
ment”). For further discussion of litigation expenses in the context of consumer remedies, see Kath-
leen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory 
Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1301 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation of Consumer 
Claims: Lessons from the U.S. Experience, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 135, 144 (1999) (“A $50 loss does not 
justify a filing fee, let alone protracted litigation.”); Meyerson, supra note 106, at 599; Edward L. 
Rubin, Essay, Trial by Battle. Trial by Argument., 56 ARK. L. REV. 261, 288 (2003). See generally 
Iain D.C. Ramsay, Consumer Redress Mechanisms for Poor-Quality and Defective Products, 31 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 117 (1981) (positing that an effective system of redress requires reconceptualizing 
individual harms as broad, collective harm to consumers). 
194 See Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disappearance of Low-Income Litigants from the Civil 
Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1536 (2016) (discussing how limitations on class actions may have a 
particularly adverse effect on marginalized and low-income consumers). 
195 See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer Protec-
tion Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 663, 
665 (2008) (“Arbitration privatizes the justice system, hiding litigation involving consumers from 
government review.”). See generally Imre S. Szalai, The Supreme Court’s Lamps Plus Arbitration 
Decision: A Fading Light for Class Actions, 25 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2019) (arguing that, by 
opting out of the traditional judicial system, firms are creating private justice mechanisms that result 
in loss of access to the courts for consumers and employees). 
196 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. Indeed, some have argued that forum choice claus-
es should be considered invalid per se. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 116, at 730. 
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dence and impose caps on firms’ liability are further examples of prevalent 
discouraging terms that might have the same effect.197 
To conclude, the inherent features of consumer litigation coupled with the 
unique characteristics of the unconscionability doctrine make judicial scrutiny 
a costly, time-consuming, and ultimately very feeble regulatory mechanism for 
combating the problem of exploitative boilerplate. As Arthur Leff noted dec-
ades ago: “One cannot think of a more expensive and frustrating course than to 
seek to regulate . . . ‘contract’ quality through repeated [individual] lawsuits 
against inventive ‘wrongdoers.’”198 With this in mind, Part III of this Article 
examines a completely different regulatory means for policing exploitative 
consumer contracts: public administrative oversight. 
III. THE WAY FORWARD: ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT 
Given the failures of the three mainstream strategies explored in Part II, 
this Part suggests a novel way to tackle the problem of exploitative consumer 
contracts. Section A explains the core idea behind the proposed model and its 
underlying assumptions.199 Next, Section B delineates the comparative ad-
vantages of administrative oversight.200 Acknowledging that the devil is in the 
details, Section C addresses a variety of normative and pragmatic concerns 
associated with the implementation of the envisioned reform.201 Finally, Sec-
tion D addresses the imperative challenge of legitimacy.202 
A. The Basic Idea 
“Remember, the idea is to change as many nasty forms and practices as 
possible, not merely to add to the glorious common law tradition of even-
tually coping.”203 
The fundamental goal behind the proposal for administrative oversight is 
straightforward: drastically minimizing the free use of exploitative terms in 
consumer markets. Just like physical objects, consumer contracts require su-
                                                                                                                           
197 See, e.g., Glassford v. BrickKicker, 35 A.3d 1044, 1046 (Vt. 2011) (holding a clause limiting a 
property inspector’s liability in damages to $285 to be invalid); Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. 
Choplin, A License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Reali-
ties, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 617, 618 (2009) (discussing clauses that bar oral or external evidence re-
garding the seller or its agent’s representations outside of the written contract). 
198 Leff, Consumers, supra note 32, at 356 (footnote omitted). 
199 See infra notes 203–212 and accompanying text. 
200 See infra notes 213–236 and accompanying text. 
201 See infra notes 237–261 and accompanying text. 
202 See infra notes 262–275 and accompanying text. 
203 Leff, Consumers, supra note 32, at 357. 
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pervision to minimize the legal risks they entail.204 In fact, administrative 
agencies have long been responsible for protecting consumers from dangerous 
products and unfair and deceptive business practices.205 The proposal that this 
Article considers here is therefore in line with the already deep, and at times 
inevitable, governmental involvement in economic markets for the protection 
of consumers and the promotion of fair and efficient competition.206 Just as 
governmental efforts to clean markets from unsafe products and dishonest ad-
vertising practices are principally justifiable, so are efforts to free consumer 
markets from harmful boilerplate.207 In both cases, such intervention can pro-
mote fairer and more efficient results. The ensuing discussion is intended to 
substantiate this claim. 
At this preliminary stage, it is useful to highlight two fundamental guid-
ing principles underlying this Article’s proposal. The first emphasizes the ad-
vantage of prevention over treatment.208 Generally speaking, it is more effec-
tive and often cheaper to prevent a serious problem or a risk from materializing 
than trying to solve the problem or mitigate the losses after the fact.209 Ex ante 
prevention is especially attractive when a problem is recurrent and has exten-
sive scope, and when ex post means have consistently failed to resolve it—as 
is the case in the context of exploitative consumer contract terms. 
The second conceptual principle builds on the idea of exploitative boiler-
plate as an agency problem.210 The argument is that because consumers do not 
                                                                                                                           
204 See infra note 207 and accompanying text. This analogy was recognized and developed half a 
century ago by Arthur Leff. See generally Leff, Contract, supra note 32. 
205 For example, the FTC holds sweeping powers and authority. See Federal Trade Commission 
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58. Similar authority exists at the state level for certain administrative agencies 
or government ministries (most often the department of justice) under UDAP legislation. See, e.g., 
Consumer Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750–1784 (West 2021), invalidated in part by 
Perez v. Nidek Co., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (S.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 711 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2013), and 
invalidated in part by In Re: Apple iPhone 3G Prods. Liab. Litig., 728 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (N.D. Cal. 
2010); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 2021). 
206 The opening policy statement on the FTC’s website states: “The FTC works to advance gov-
ernment policies that protect consumers and promote competition.” Policy, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/policy [https://perma.cc/36MN-K7T6]. 
207 See Zamir, supra note 41, at 299–300 (“Just as regulators set minimal standards for the safety 
of physical products . . . they should set such standards for the safety of contractual products, which 
may be just as risky.” (footnote omitted)); see also Zamir & Farkash, supra note 24, at 163 (“As the 
subprime crisis has demonstrated, unsafe contracts can involve risks to individuals and society that are 
no less damaging than the risks of unsafe drugs and toys.”). 
208 As the famous adage goes, “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” 
209 Admittedly, the issue is often more complex, and the challenge is one of striking a balance be-
tween prevention and treatment. Cf. J. Paul Kelleher, Prevention vs. Treatment: What’s the Right 
Balance?, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REVS. (Mar. 18, 2012), http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/29529-prevention-vs-
treatment-what-s-the-right-balance/ [https://perma.cc/QS98-P5ED] (reviewing PREVENTION VS. 
TREATMENT: WHAT’S THE RIGHT BALANCE? (Halley S. Faust & Paul T. Menzel eds., 2012)). 
210 See Gillette, supra note 11, at 683. 
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have any impact on most of the content of the contracts they enter into, and 
because such content is determined unilaterally by form-users that enjoy supe-
rior expertise and bargaining power, the latter should be regarded as agents 
acting not on behalf of themselves alone but also of the consumers with which 
they interact.211 Nevertheless, because drafters have structured incentives to 
abuse their power and ignore the interests of consumers, special scrutiny over 
the agents’ acts is warranted.212 That is precisely where administrative agencies 
can step in and make sure that form-users properly consider the interests of 
consumers. 
B. The Relative Advantage of Administrative Oversight 
Before moving from theory to practice, it is important to highlight the rel-
ative advantage of administrative supervision compared with other regulatory 
tools. Accordingly, this Section explains why administrative agencies are qual-
ified for this task and can do a far better job than courts and legislatures in 
tackling exploitative terms in consumer contracts. The comparison begins with 
judicial scrutiny, continue with statutory content-based regulation, move on to 
mandatory disclosures, and conclude with voluntary pre-approval mechanisms. 
1. Advantages Over Judicial Scrutiny 
One key advantage of administrative control is that it does not depend on 
the private initiative of individual consumers. For various reasons delineated 
above, individual consumers are not likely to insist upon their rights.213 None 
of the contractual obstructions—such as bans on class actions, mandatory arbi-
tration, and indemnity clauses—facing consumers and limiting their access to 
justice affect public enforcement actions. Furthermore, the public administrator 
is free from the inherently idiosyncratic and often inconsistent considerations 
that motivate and influence individual litigation. Rather than seeking redress 
for any individual instance of actual exploitation, as courts do, enforcement 
agencies can channel public resources more efficiently and focus on the overall 
most problematic terms for consumers as a group.214 
                                                                                                                           
211 Cf. id. at 689. Differently put, the expectation is that the seller be “other-regarding” while 
drafting the non-negotiated terms of the consumer contract. Cf. PETER M. GERHART, CONTRACT LAW 
AND SOCIAL MORALITY 157, 160 (2021). 
212 Cf. Kar, supra note 97, at 116 (linking the need to revisit mandatory disclosure rules to the fact 
that current rules “often allow corporations to disorient consumers and manipulate their subjective 
choices—thus creating imbalances of power”). 
213 See discussion supra Subsection II.C.5. 
214 The relative weakness of private enforcement compared to public enforcement has been rec-
ognized even in jurisdictions where statutory regulation of unfair standard terms is well developed and 
where consumer organizations have standing. See generally Reinhard Steennot, Public and Private 
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Significantly, administrative action is not limited to providing redress for 
particular past grievances, which is the traditional goal of court remedies.215 
Rather, the administrative remedy can be forward-looking and wider in scope 
and effect. Its prime objective should be to discipline unruly businesses from 
using exploitative boilerplate in the first place, thus deterring other firms from 
engaging in similar practices. As the next Section details, the specific preven-
tive measures that this Article suggests adopting reach further than any remedy 
a court can grant in a particular case.216 These mitigating measures can impact 
countless consumers at once, as they immediately affect the rights of every 
consumer with whom the disciplined business has ever contracted.217 
Administrative agencies are also superior from a comparative institutional 
perspective. Such agencies are better suited to make broad and macro calls on 
market efficiency. They have a superior ability to engage in market analysis, 
consult big data, and compare aggregate harms to consumers and aggregate 
benefits for firms. These agencies are better equipped to analyze data pertain-
ing to levels of competition, market structure, prevalent industry customs, the 
relationship between terms and prices, and the potential impact of agencies’ 
intervention on third parties (suppliers, investors, lenders, servicers, other in-
dustries, etc.).218 This information is not generally available—and indeed is 
often inaccessible—for judges presiding in traditional civil cases.219 Without 
reliable information on these matters, one cannot expect courts to decide 
whether a particular standard term is harmful or inefficient. 
                                                                                                                           
Enforcement in the Field of Unfair Contract Terms, 23 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 589 (2015) (surveying the 
European landscape and making this observation). 
215 See, e.g., Walter Gellhorn, The Law’s Response to the Demand for Both Stability and Change: 
The Legislative and Administrative Response, 17 VAND. L. REV. 91, 100 (1963) (“The sanctions 
courts can apply are limited in variety and range. . . . [T]hese operate chiefly . . . to offset wrongs 
already done.”). 
216 Cf. Hondius, supra note 155, at 528 (“[T]he introduction of injunctions and cease-and-desist 
orders against further use of specific clauses endows the new-type [judicial] decisions with an effect 
on a large number of future transactions, far transcending the single contracts at stake in traditional 
litigation.”). 
217 See, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 33, at 441 (“[C]ourts typically frame the issue as a 
dispute between a single consumer and a business, rather than as an aggregate policy that affects the 
vast majority of consumers and businesses . . . .”). 
218 See Becher, supra note 27, at 140–44. 
219 See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 20, at 982 (“[G]iven the limited resources available to courts to 
reverse engineer the contracting process, there is little reason to believe that judicial decisions will 
reflect a coherent analysis of the conditions that distinguish exploitation from efficient risk alloca-
tion.” (footnote omitted)); see also Hugh Collins, The Freedom to Circulate Documents: Regulating 
Contracts in Europe, 10 EUR. L.J. 787, 793 (2004) (“[C]ourts do not have access to reliable infor-
mation about the operation of particular markets in practice, so that in concentrating on the balance of 
the formal terms they may not understand the idiosyncratic conditions under which the market sector 
has to operate.” (footnote omitted)). 
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Administrative agencies are also better capable of managing a complex 
process of deliberation with all stakeholders.220 Agencies operating in consum-
er markets (on the federal level, for example, the FTC and the Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection Bureau) have constant access to complex information. They 
have organized units and experienced personnel to conduct investigations, 
gather data, and process it to develop remedies.221 These agencies, and their 
counterparts on the state level, consist of industry-experienced or analytically-
trained persons. They are generally not made up of elected positions, which are 
inevitably more vulnerable to capture by interested groups.222 On top of that, 
and unlike the judiciary, administrative bodies are much more accustomed to 
teamwork, information sharing, and coordination with other branches of gov-
ernment or independent experts. Arguably, administrative agencies are also 
better able to maintain and utilize institutional memory. Administrative action 
is directed at wide sectors rather than contingent cases. Presumably, therefore, 
the norms governing administrative oversight can be more consistent than 
those emanating from case-by-case rulings by courts. Furthermore, administra-
tive action is much swifter than judicial review.223 All in all, this makes admin-
istrative agencies more competent than courts to study, detect, assess, and ul-
timately respond effectively to any detected exploitative boilerplate. 
2. Advantages Over Statutory Content-based Regulation 
At first blush, legislation may seem a proper regulatory tool for control-
ling exploitative boilerplate terms. Legislators enjoy a high degree of formal 
legitimacy. Lawmaking involves vibrant and transparent deliberation and re-
sults in stable and relatively accessible rules. But upon further reflection, it is 
clear that legislation also has considerable limitations that, in the case of ex-
ploitative terms, are all the more acute. 
Recall that, in the United States, content-based regulation of consumer 
contracts is the exception rather than the rule.224 Where it exists, it is piecemeal 
and partial in coverage.225 This is far from surprising. Legislators are likely to 
                                                                                                                           
220 For further discussion on the importance of deliberation, see infra Section III.C. 
221 See Bureau Structure, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ [https://perma.cc/ST2V-2AR7] (Aug. 17, 2021); Bureaus & 
Offices, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices [https://perma.cc/QFY3-
ZMAM].  
222 See infra note 230 and accompanying text (discussing, inter alia, the capability of administra-
tive agencies to resist capture by interested groups). 
223 For discussion highlighting some of the advantages of administrative agencies, see FRANK E. 
COOPER, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS 14–20 (1951). 
224 See discussion supra Subsection II.B.1. 
225 See Budnitz, supra note 195, at 666 (“Federal consumer protection law is not uniform and its 
coverage is not comprehensive.”). 
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view issues through a political lens, which makes it harder for them to form a 
sensible policy that is objective, evidence-based, and empirically informed.226 
Moreover, consumers are often under-represented in the legislation process, 
whereas legislatures are frequently heavily influenced by professional lobby-
ists representing businesses and trade organizations.227 
Most importantly, detecting exploitation in a standard form contract re-
quires a detailed legal and economic analysis. Such analysis entails acquaint-
ance not only with the specific economic sector and the overall market condi-
tions surrounding the type of transaction at hand, but also an analysis of its 
unique terms and their potential harms and benefits. It is therefore very diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to formulate concrete, exhaustive statutory rules in ad-
vance that will effectively and comprehensibly define what an exploitative 
term will look like in any particular consumer transaction.228 The legislature is 
not in a good position to make such calls, which require acquaintance with the 
conditions of dynamic consumer markets. 
In all of these respects, administrative control enjoys major advantages 
over statutory regulation.229 Administrative agencies have superior institutional 
competence, are better capable of responding to market dynamics, are more 
isolated from political pressure, and thus may be less vulnerable to capture by 
interest groups.230 
                                                                                                                           
226 Cf. Becher, supra note 27, at 108–13, 141 (discussing the predominant flaws in the legislative 
process and arguing, inter alia, that “virtually every evidence-based issue in the realm of consumer 
law policy can become politicized”). 
227 Id. at 109–10. 
228 See, e.g., Collins, supra note 219, at 793 (“The open-textured standard has the potential to ad-
dress the problem of precise rules that they may prove insufficiently responsive to the particular mar-
ket conditions of a transaction.”). 
229 For further discussion of some of the advantages that administrative agencies enjoy over statu-
tory regulation, see Becher, supra note 27, at 140–44. 
230 See Zamir, supra note 41, at 300 (arguing that expert administrative agencies are less prone to 
make bad decisions and judgments due to cognitive biases and incomplete information). See generally 
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Expert Paternalism, 64 FLA. L. REV. 721 (2012) (claiming that anti-paternalist 
arguments are contested by empirical evidence and that in many areas experts are better decision-
makers than laypeople). Of course, this is not to say that public agencies are immune from political 
pressure. Political changes can and do greatly impact their performance, priorities, and personnel. An 
unfortunate recent example is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau under the administration of 
President Trump. For some accounts, see Nicholas Confessore, Mick Mulvaney’s Master Class in 
Destroying a Bureaucracy from Within, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 16, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/16/magazine/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-trump.html [https://perma.cc/ZKN7-
V5AA]; Adam Liptak & Alan Rappeport, Supreme Court Lifts Limits on Trump’s Power to Fire Con-
sumer Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/29/us/politics/cfpb-
supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/V7EC-M6WG]; Planet Money, Mulvaney vs the CFPB, NPR 
(Mar. 28, 2018) https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2018/03/28/597761300/episode-832-mulvaney-
vs-the-cfpb [https://perma.cc/3R53-9JQH]. 
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That said, the importance of a basic legislative scheme should not be un-
derestimated. Where exploitation is clear-cut, a statutory ban of especially 
harmful terms can be of great value. Legislation also has the important role of 
stating the social goals to be promoted by the regulation of consumer contracts 
and the key means toward their fulfillment. In so doing, legislatures set the 
stage and provide the authority for other branches of government to step in and 
promote the legislative goals. At the end of the day, content-based regulation 
of consumer contracts would perform best if it is coupled with supplementary 
administrative control.231 
3. Administrative Oversight and Mandatory Disclosure 
The preceding analysis is largely applicable to mandated disclosures, the 
success of which is highly contested.232 On the face of it, there seems to be no 
necessary interaction between this regulatory technique and administrative 
oversight. Although disclosure focuses on the procedural aspects of the bar-
gaining process, the proposed administrative model focuses primarily on the 
substantive content of consumer contracts. 
Nevertheless, on further inspection, the two tools can actually supplement 
one another. First, the administrative model is by no means inherently limited 
to overseeing the substantive aspects of consumer contracts. When inspecting 
consumer contracts, the administrative authority can also monitor procedural 
aspects. Second, and relatedly, a systematic monitoring system along the pro-
posed lines will enable the government to verify if, and to what extent, firms 
are obeying mandatory disclosure rules. Thus, administrative oversight of con-
sumer contracts should have two functions. Most prominently, it should strive 
to prevent substantive exploitation by the widespread use of unfair terms. As a 
secondary goal, it should also assist in the enforcement of mandatory disclo-
sure duties by collecting valuable, reliable data regarding their actual imple-
mentation in various economic sectors. 
4. Administrative Oversight and Voluntary Pre-approval 
A fairly recent reform proposal in the field of standard form contracts is 
“voluntary pre-approval.” Generally speaking, the idea is to grant businesses 
the opportunity to apply to a nominated professional body (be it private or pub-
lic) for approval of their form contracts. The approval, once given, carries a 
promise that the examined contract is not exploitative. Sellers can then com-
                                                                                                                           
231 See, e.g., Gellhorn, supra note 215, at 104–07 (discussing why and how legislatures and ad-
ministrators should work in tandem). 
232 See discussion supra Subsection II.B.2. For a comprehensive and forceful critique of mandato-
ry disclosure, see generally BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 165. 
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municate this approval to attract consumers and possibly use it as a shield 
against future complaints and judicial review.233 
Alas, voluntary pre-approval involves difficulties. First and foremost, its 
success depends on sellers’ inclination to apply for approval. The complexity 
and uncertainty of such approval mechanisms may fuel skepticism for sellers 
regarding their utility. More importantly, approval entails the potential removal 
(or revision) of exploitative terms, which firms benefit from and would hesi-
tate to expose. This will make exploitative sellers disinclined to take the risk 
involved in submitting their forms for authoritative inspection. In short, if 
sellers are not sufficiently incentivized to compete over the quality of their 
form contracts to begin with, and if they have little to lose from keeping the 
contracts away from the public eye, voluntary pre-approval is unlikely to gain 
much traction. On top of sellers’ hesitations, pre-approval bodies might be ex-
posed to economic pressure and captured by industry interests. This can distort 
the integrity of the process and undermine consumers’ trust. 
The administrative enforcement model we propose has superior potential 
vis-à-vis the voluntary pre-approval model. First and foremost, it does not de-
pend on the goodwill of firms being willing to submit to scrutiny. Second, it 
provides stronger deterrence mechanisms in the form of fines, penalties, and 
other administrative measures, which the pre-approval model cannot im-
pose.234 Third, administrative control, as we envision it, does not end with im-
munity or approval of entire forms and thus does not require the abundant re-
sources associated with the pre-approval process.235 Furthermore, although the 
fear of capture is not eliminated under this model, we argue it is greatly re-
duced. This, we believe, may be due to various potential factors, including 
public stature, commitment, relative transparency, and exposure to judicial re-
view that often characterize administrative action. 
Last but not least, pre-approval compels the approving body to attend to 
whatever contracts are being brought before it, regardless of the social costs 
and gains from inspection. Administrative control instead leaves the enforcing 
agency with full discretion to choose which contracts and markets to scruti-
nize. Thus, under the proposed model, the administrative agencies will be able 
to cherry-pick the most problematic terms, contracts, or markets rather than 
satisfy the needs of interested sellers.236 This can assist agencies in prioritizing 
their efforts and aligning them with their goals and budgets. 
                                                                                                                           
233 For sources developing the concept of voluntary pre-approval, see supra note 20 and accom-
panying text. 
234 See discussion infra Subsection III.C.4. 
235 On the focus of the inquiry under this model, see discussion infra Subsection III.C.2. 
236 See discussion infra Subsection III.C.1. 
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C. Administrative Oversight in Action 
“We think that it is time, in consumer protection law . . . to look for 
regulation with bite.”237 
The foregoing analysis underlined the many promises of administrative 
oversight as a regulatory tool. A viable administrative solution requires a pre-
cise and workable framework. This Section proposes such an account. 
Before addressing the scrutiny process on a granular level, a brief note 
about its operational principles is due. The goal of the project should be to 
minimize consumer exposure to the risks of exploitative boilerplate in a cost-
effective manner. We intentionally choose the term “minimize” because com-
pletely eradicating boilerplate exploitation is currently an unrealistically utopi-
an goal. Relatedly, we also acknowledge that resource constraints can have a 
deep impact on the operation, structure, content, and success of the scrutiny 
process. This entails the need to prioritize enforcement efforts.238 
As a starting point, administrative agencies should channel their resources 
to tackle the more significant legal risks, in terms of both scope and severity. 
This requires developing clear enforcement policies and priorities. In this con-
text, three operational guidelines seem to be most important. First, an effective 
oversight mechanism will require an optimized combination of human skills 
and technological capacities. Second, to capitalize on their advantages, agen-
cies should implement simple and low-cost operational procedures to facilitate 
a dynamic and swift reaction to exploitative boilerplate once detected. Third, 
the agency should adopt a holistic approach to markets and should strive to be 
evidence-based, rather than politically driven. 
Keeping in mind these general principles, this Section now turns to con-
sider the pragmatic aspects of administrative oversight in more detail. Natural-
ly, this is merely the first step of a dramatic law reform. Any initially imple-
mented framework should be revisited and developed as experience is gained 
and further lessons are learned. 
1. Setting Priorities 
Recall that exploitative boilerplate may take three shapes: legally invalid 
terms, terms voidable under the unconscionability doctrine, and unfair terms 
                                                                                                                           
237 The Univ. of Chi., More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 
YOUTUBE, at 04:42 (Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mlfd7vSrAP4&ab_channel
=TheUniversityofChicago [https://perma.cc/U3U9-WG9J] (quoting Omri Ben-Shahar) (criticizing 
mandated disclosure as inefficient and ineffective means to protect consumers). 
238 See discussion infra Subsection III.C.1. 
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under the wider and more flexible definition proposed above.239 Each of these 
terms requires a different level of scrutiny and involves different processes. 
The main dividing line, we suggest, is between preventing exploitation in the 
widest sense and preventing it only when it involves legally invalid terms. 
Enforcing substantive fairness (or conscionability, for that matter) in the 
sense of preventing exploitation in consumer contracts will significantly widen 
the scope of the administrative enforcer’s intervention in the market. It will 
involve the challenge of applying vague standards, considering conflicting 
values, and deciding borderline cases. For instance, a determination of whether 
an arbitration clause, a forum selection clause, an exemption clause, or a uni-
lateral modification clause is unconscionable or unfair can become a pretty 
complex and loaded decision, at least in certain contexts. Detecting legally 
invalid terms, on the other hand, will typically require significantly less admin-
istrative discretion and resources. To illustrate, a term that fines a consumer for 
posting a genuine and honest negative review online is clearly invalid and, as 
such, raises no complex dilemmas. Such a case presents a straightforward in-
stance of exploitation that the pertinent authorities should simply eliminate.240 
Besides, because legally invalid terms are theoretically unenforceable, en-
forcing legality on form-drafters does not impose any new burdens on them. 
Enforcing substantive fairness (or unconscionability), however, will place sig-
nificant new burdens on firms. Here, the enforcer interferes with a term that is 
merely unfair or voidable (under the unconscionability doctrine) rather than 
void or invalid per se. An administrative order prohibiting the further use of an 
unfair (or unconscionable) term is therefore typically more intrusive and may 
be more controversial than restraining the further use of legally invalid terms. 
Seemingly, the above analysis justifies adopting a humble and thin ap-
proach that would target only legally invalid terms. Nevertheless, administra-
tors should realize that the risks unfair or unconscionable terms pose to con-
sumers are no less significant and, as a matter of fact, much more prevalent 
than flatly “illegal” terms. Hence, a thicker reform that would target both inva-
lid and unfair terms can have a much broader effect on consumer markets. 
Next, this Article proposes that enforcement efforts should examine both 
substantive and procedural issues, although the focus should generally be on 
the former. Procedural issues may include, for instance, unreadable and exces-
sively long contracts, non-compliance with mandated disclosures or other for-
mal requirements, inaccessible or illegible text, and the like.241 A substantive 
inquiry, on the other hand, will require assessing the legal and economic sig-
                                                                                                                           
239 See discussion supra Section I.B.; see also supra note 75 and accompanying text (describing 
our proposed definition of unfair terms). 
240 See Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 45b. 
241 Examples may include making a term conspicuous or having terms separately signed. 
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nificance of the imbalanced terms—a mission that would be much more chal-
lenging for the overseeing agency. That said, we generally recommend priori-
tizing substantive supervision over procedural oversight. As emphasized 
above, there are good reasons to doubt whether improving the procedural as-
pects of consumer contracts will indeed have a considerable positive impact on 
consumers’ behavior.242 The removal of exploitative terms from numerous 
forms following administrative action, on the other hand, will significantly 
benefit the market and will have a direct impact on the welfare of countless 
consumers. We would not, therefore, recommend relinquishing the effort of 
investing in the prevention of substantive exploitation in favor of a thin regula-
tory approach focused on safeguarding procedural fairness alone.243 
The next priorities-related challenge is the need to identify which markets 
or contracts the administrative enforcer ought to supervise at any given time. 
Based on the analysis so far, we suggest focusing on markets where the aggre-
gate expected loss from the use of exploitative boilerplate seems the greatest. 
Although theoretically simple, applying this principle is admittedly challeng-
ing. 
To confront this challenge, administrative agencies should consider the 
following factors, among others. First is the nature of the risk. Special attention 
should be given to risks that endanger important non-pecuniary consumer in-
terests. These may include, for instance, the right to privacy, free speech, and 
access to justice. A second important factor is market size. Clearly, the greater 
the number of consumers exposed to an exploitative form, the bigger the scope 
of the potential harm. A third crucial factor is the magnitude of the expected 
loss. For example, if the typical risk latent in a widespread exploitative term is 
largely pecuniary, it makes sense to invest more efforts in screening contracts 
that are being frequently used in economically large transactions. Examples 
may include, but are not limited to, long-term or high-cost services, credit card 
and bank agreements, real estate transactions, telecommunication services, 
vehicle purchases, mobile phone, cable and internet service contracts, etc. 
Fourth, enforcement agencies must look beyond mere numbers. Administrators 
should also prioritize instances in which vulnerable consumers (for example, 
low-income or elderly consumers) are often affected. 
Obviously, the exact balancing act ought not to be set in stone, nor should 
it remain unchanged from year to year. Instead, it is better left open for future 
reconsideration and should be constantly subject to revision and incremental 
shifts based on the collection of new data. 
                                                                                                                           
242 See supra Subsection II.B.2. 
243 For support of substantive mandatory rules, see generally Zamir, supra note 41. 
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Finally, reputational constraints, levels of competition, and consumer 
complaints can also assist in identifying suspect markets. Nevertheless, given 
the fickle nature of these indications, policy-makers should approach them 
with healthy skepticism. Ideally, good coordination with other relevant bod-
ies—such as consumer advocates or assistance groups, industry regulators, and 
law enforcement units—will assist enforcers to use these factors wisely rather 
than being swayed by them.244 
2. Gathering and Reviewing Consumer Contracts 
After identifying possible suspect markets and contracts, the next step is 
to obtain the required information and begin processing it. Initially, we suggest 
issuing formal notices, informing the target firms of the agency’s intention to 
review their standard consumer forms. The notice should include a list of the 
types of transactions the administrative agency is focused on. It should further 
request the firms to provide the agency with: (1) an electronic folder contain-
ing copies of all available versions of the relevant transactions; (2) the (esti-
mated) number of affected consumers; and (3) a statement confirming that the 
provided information is, inasmuch as possible, updated, complete, and accu-
rate.245 
With this information and other relevant data, the agencies will now face 
the most crucial and challenging stage of identifying exploitative terms in the 
forms handed over for their inspection.246 At the preliminary stage, the agency 
should employ a computerized advanced language analysis of the inspected 
forms.247 The market already offers some impressive technological tools that 
can read, explicate, simplify, tailor, and benchmark consumer contracts. The 
sophistication and effectiveness of these machine learning algorithms will only 
grow with time. Enforcement agencies would be wise to adopt artificial intelli-
gence technologies and contribute to their design and development as means to 
                                                                                                                           
244 Such collaborations have already occurred in other consumer protection domains. See, e.g., 
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC, Partners Conduct First Compliance Sweep Under Newly 
Amended Used Car Rule (July 12, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/07/
ftc-partners-conduct-first-compliance-sweep-under-newly-amended [https://perma.cc/FY54-V5M2]. 
245 As in other areas of enforcement, the agency must be equipped with the authority to investi-
gate and verify the reliability of the information and to collect other relevant material. 
246 Relevant information for identifying exploitative terms may include data on consumer com-
plaints, previous litigation, data from other consumer organizations or governmental units on past 
complaints, etc. 
247 Computerized language analysis is an ever-growing and fast-developing field of computer sci-
ence. For some of its relatively recent achievements, see generally COMPUTER AIDED VERIFICATION: 
31ST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS PT. 1, reprinted in LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER 
SCIENCE 11561 (Isil Dillig & Serdar Tasiran eds., 2019). 
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assist in sampling, classifying, and ultimately detecting exploitative terms in a 
cost-effective way.248 
At the next stage, the agency should focus on the non-salient, pro-seller 
provisions that stand out as deserving careful analysis.249 Though seemingly 
straightforward, such a focus is a double-edged sword. Assessing terms in iso-
lation, rather than in the context of the contract as a whole, can give the deci-
sion-maker a wrong impression.250 A pro-seller term that may seem exploita-
tive in itself can be balanced elsewhere in the contract and thus be ultimately 
fair.251 On the other hand, a term that in itself may not cross the threshold for 
unconscionability (or substantive unfairness) may add up, with other one-sided 
terms, to make the contract exploitative as a whole. For instance, a contract 
that includes a class action waiver, an arbitration clause, a choice of law 
clause, and a forum selection clause may, in aggregation, have a strong chilling 
effect on consumers’ overall access to justice, one that goes beyond the indi-
vidual terms when viewed in isolation.252 Thus, although a focus on specific 
suspect terms may be more cost-effective, the agency must remain cognizant 
that further legal and economic analysis by its professional and experienced 
personnel may justify a different conclusion than that reached by any algo-
rithmic analysis, sophisticated as it may eventually become. 
Per this insight, and because the unfairness of any term must be sensitive 
to sellers’ rationale for incorporating it, the next step should introduce a proce-
                                                                                                                           
248 For a detailed discussion and illustrative examples, see generally Yonathan A. Arbel & 
Shmuel I. Becher, Contracts in the Age of Smart Readers, 90 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming) (Univ. 
of Ala. Legal Stud., Rsch. Paper No. 3740356, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3740356 [https://
perma.cc/5L8H-JHEK]. See Yonathan A. Arbel, Adminization: Gatekeeping Consumer Contracts, 71 
VAND. L. REV. 121, 146–51 (2018), for an interesting analysis of the advantages of artificial intelli-
gence in administrative sampling processes. 
249 Though focusing on non-salient terms is sensible, this is not to imply that salient terms should 
automatically be immune from scrutiny. If anything, recent scholarship demonstrates that even price 
terms can be manipulative. See Zamir & Mendelson, supra note 151, at 437–43. In a sense, when 
price terms become complex, they may actually become non-salient and thus justify inspection under 
the administrative proposal. 
250 Indeed, some foreign legislatures expect courts to examine the contract as a whole prior to de-
termining whether a term is unfair. See, e.g., Fair Trading Act 1986, s 46L(2) (N.Z.) (“In determining 
whether a term in a consumer contract is unfair, the court . . . must take into account— . . . (b) the 
contract as a whole.”); § 3, Standard Contracts Law, 5743–1982, LSI 37 6 (1982–83) (Isr.) (prescrib-
ing a similar test). 
251 See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 20, at 979–80 (noting that, for instance, unilateral change terms 
“may be exploitative or not, depending on whether the risks are priced and perhaps on the propriety of 
the supplementary terms that are ultimately inserted”); id. at 996 (“[T]he agency would presumably 
want to investigate whether any ostensibly pro-seller effects were offset either by pro-buyer terms 
elsewhere in the contract or by a pricing scheme that reflected the risks taken by buyers.”). 
252 Cf. Shmuel I. Becher & Uri Benoliel, Dark Contracts 29–32 (Aug. 25, 2021) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3911528 [https://perma.cc/RRD6-
D2YR] (discussing the aggregate impact that non-transparent contracts may have on consumers). 
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dure by which the seller and the agency’s staff can deliberate the suspect terms. 
The process should facilitate exchanging views, allow context-dependent clarifi-
cations, and advance information sharing. Enforcers would do well to bear in 
mind that this stage is designed to ensure that terms that seem unreasonably im-
balanced at first blush are indeed exploitative. Hopefully, this stage will mini-
mize enforcement errors and increase cooperation with the business sector. 
As experience develops and knowledge accumulates, administrative en-
forcement agencies may identify a set of prima facie problematic terms, either 
in the context of specific economic markets or more generally. In such cases, 
we advise the careful and gradual development of tentative and non-exhaustive 
lists of such terms for each relevant sector. The lists should be revisited and 
updated periodically. Such lists should also be communicated, or at least pub-
licly accessible and transparent, so that businesses, consumers, and profession-
al associations could consider these tentative lists. 
In this context, one should recall that various suppliers who operate with-
in a specific market often adopt the same set of contractual terms.253 So far, 
this has contributed to the proliferation of exploitative terms. Under this Arti-
cle’s proposal, however, this reality can actually augment the positive impact 
of the agency’s rulings or findings. This is so, because suppliers may voluntari-
ly adopt modifications that follow the agency’s scrutiny of a competitor’s 
forms. That is, though the agency’s decisions were made vis-à-vis a specific 
actor, other players within the market may opt to revise their contracts accord-
ingly, either for fear of being called to scrutiny, or, ideally, as a result of 
healthy competition over the quality of consumer forms. 
A final recommendation pertains to the evidentiary standard the agency 
should apply. Here, we suggest adopting a rather conservative standard, under 
which a term or a contract will trigger administrative reaction only if it is high-
ly exploitative.254 The main drawback of such a demanding standard is clear: it 
will leave many questionable terms to circulate freely in consumer markets. 
Nonetheless, the advantages of such a cautious approach will outweigh 
this admitted weakness. Firstly, as with any newly introduced law reform, it 
will take some time for the system to adjust and gain expertise. To minimize 
                                                                                                                           
253 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. For further discussion, findings, and analysis, see 
generally Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts: The 
Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2008); Mark R. Patterson, 
Standardization of Standard-Form Contracts: Competition and Contract Implications, 52 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 327 (2010); Margaret Jane Radin, Commentary, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modu-
larity and the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223 (2006). 
254 See generally Omri Ben-Shahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts, 63 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2011) 
(claiming, in a different context, that courts invalidating unconscionable standard terms should sup-
plement them not with the most appropriate term, but with a term reflecting the minimal level of pro-
tection for the consumer). 
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the risk of overshooting during this formative period, a more demanding 
standard is justified. Likewise, a high standard that can be relaxed with time 
will minimize the chances of the agency losing public trust and of being (just-
ly) criticized or even politically threatened. 
Secondly, because the implementation of the proposed model will no 
doubt entail significant public resources, those resources must be invested as 
cost-effectively as possible. Arguably, focusing on the most obvious examples 
of consumer exploitation reduces the risk of wasteful investments in borderline 
or niche cases. It will also reduce how frequently the agency expends resources 
to defend controversial decisions in court or the media. Therefore, at least dur-
ing the formative phase of the proposed regulatory project, we suggest adher-
ing to a relatively demanding threshold. 
3. The Formal Investigatory Stages 
Carefully designed procedures are an essential component in the success-
ful implementation of any serious reform. To be sure, covering the whole range 
of procedural issues is impractical at this stage. Nonetheless, some key guide-
lines are of importance and should be briefly discussed. 
For starters, the formal stages of the agency’s work should be informed 
by the following two sets of values. The first concerns fairness, voice, and due 
process. Here, we allude to the fact that sellers’ interests may be jeopardized 
following the review of their form contracts. Therefore, it is necessary to allow 
them to participate in the deliberation process, ensuring that they are heard 
with full attention and an open mind. The second value, and to an extent a con-
flicting one, is efficiency without creating the expectation of a trial-like back 
and forth or formal defense. There is a need to facilitate low-cost and swift 
administrative reaction to boilerplate exploitation. 
Accordingly, several sets of procedural rules ought to be developed to en-
able a smooth and efficient oversight process. The process would begin with a 
formal first notice which would: (1) alert the firm that the administrative agen-
cy intends to inspect their forms; (2) explain the firm’s rights and obligations 
in the review process; and (3) affirm the firm’s duty to comply and cooperate 
with the investigation. The notice should also detail the general enforcement 
scheme, elucidating possible outcomes of the investigation and the administra-
tive steps that may follow. 
Next, if preliminary analysis points to presumably exploitative terms, the 
agency should inform the relevant firm about these findings. At this stage, the 
administrative authority should summon the firm to commence a deliberation 
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process with an agency official.255 The aim of deliberation, as explained above, 
is to allow the firm the opportunity to refute the presumption that the terms are 
exploitative by pointing out their economic necessity or highlighting particular 
benefits to the consumer that may outweigh the burdens imposed by the term 
at issue. In certain cases, at the full discretion of the enforcing agency, these 
(and later) stages can involve consultation with consumer advocacy organiza-
tions as well as pertinent trade unions.256 
Importantly, the deliberation process can yield consensual agreements be-
tween the firm and the agency (the parties). In such cases, the parties will 
reach an agreement as to eliminating exploitation from the firm’s forms. Such 
an agreement, which might take the shape of a consent order, should become 
public, as to allow further feedback and scrutiny before it becomes final and 
binding. Being transparent in the process will also minimize the risk of regula-
tory capture or unjustified compromises. The public nature of the procedure 
may also encourage other firms to check whether their contracts come into line 
with the agency’s standards before the enforcing agency turns to them for in-
spection. 
Thereafter, if the parties have not reached an accord, the agency should 
make a final decision regarding the terms at stake. The decision should explain 
the legal and economic reasoning behind the agency’s conclusions. It will also 
clarify the remedy or sanction that the agency imposed in response to the find-
ing of exploitative terms; most typically a declaration or a restraining order.257 
The agency must convey the decision to the pertinent firm whose terms were 
subject to scrutiny. Importantly, a record of the decision should be publicly 
available in an official report and on the agency’s website. We strongly rec-
ommend actively communicating such decisions to any major enterprise active 
in the relevant sector. 
4. Responding to Exploitative Boilerplate: Remedies and Sanctions 
To realize the goal of minimizing consumer exposure to exploitative 
terms, two remedial responses seem necessary. First, the agency must ensure 
that exploitative terms that consumers have already accepted become ineffec-
tive as soon as possible. Second, it must ensure that the seller does not use 
                                                                                                                           
255 It is reasonable to assume that many firms will regularly retain an attorney to accompany them 
in the deliberation process, which will add to the fairness and transparency of the procedure. 
256 This is a coin with two sides. On the one hand, it can give the consumer and the firm more 
voice in the process. On the other hand, this will inevitably increase administrative costs and dilate the 
timeframe. 
257 For discussion of these remedies, see infra Subsection III.C.4. 
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those exploitative terms in any future similar transactions. Accordingly, the 
agency should be empowered to issue orders guaranteeing these results.259F258 
This entails an authority to issue official orders of two distinct types. 
First, it should issue an order or declaration invalidating any term it finds ex-
ploitative in any contract previously executed with any consumer based on the 
same inspected form (or conditioning its validity on neutralizing its exploita-
tive aspect). To materialize the remedial effect of this sanction, the agency 
would order the firm to make a reasonable effort to inform all relevant con-
sumers, within a prescribed period of time, that the invalidated terms are no 
longer effective or enforceable—or explain the nature of the remedy the agen-
cy has ordered. Second, the agency may—and absent special circumstances 
should—issue an administrative injunction (for example, an order to cease and 
desist) prohibiting the seller from further use of similar exploitative terms in 
any substantially similar transactions.259 
Importantly, failure to comply with any of these administrative orders 
should result in either administrative or civil penalties for non-compliance. 
Potentially higher penalties for repeat offenders, who have continued to use 
terms previously declared to be exploitative, should also be available.260 Addi-
tionally, the imposition of any such administrative sanctions and remedies 
must be publicly visible and subject to judicial review or at least an appeal be-
fore an appropriate, impartial administrative tribunal. The mere option of chal-
lenging the agency’s decision will, in and of itself, incentivize the agency to be 
cautious and professional in its decision-making.261 
Finally, enforcement agencies can entertain the interesting idea of reward-
ing—rather than sanctioning—firms whose contracts are found to be especially 
fair, balanced, and (relatively) transparent. The reward or recognition can take 
various forms. One example is a sympathetic publication on the agency’s web-
                                                                                                                           
258 See infra Section III.D (discussing the formal legal basis for the agency’s actions). 
259 This raises the thorny issue of which transactions are “substantially similar” to the ones in 
which the authority found exploitation. For instance, can contracts be sufficiently “similar” if they 
deal with vehicles rather than real estate? While acknowledging this practical challenge, some useful 
guidelines as to what would be considered a “similar transaction” can, in due course, be developed 
and made public. 
260 For a comparable argument in favor of such an administrative penalty system, see generally 
Rohit Chopra & Samuel A.A. Levine, The Case for Resurrecting the FTC Act’s Penalty Offense Au-
thority, U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3721256 [https://perma.cc/GY2J-
ARN2] (arguing in favor of the FTC penalizing repeated misconduct by firms with greater severity 
after firms have received formal condemnation for their violatory practices). 
261 Cf. Paul R. Kleindorfer, What if You Know You Will Have to Explain Your Choices to Others 
Afterwards? Legitimation in Decision Making, in THE IRRATIONAL ECONOMIST: MAKING DECISIONS 
IN A DANGEROUS WORLD 72, 72 (Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Paul Slovic eds., 2010) (“The anticipa-
tion that one may be required to explain or justify decisions after the fact might be expected to affect 
the decisions that are made.”). 
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site. Another is a formal “fair trader” certification which the seller may lawful-
ly use in certain advertisements. The overseeing agencies should also have the 
authority to combine various types of positive incentives. 
D. The Legitimacy Challenge 
Radical law reforms face serious challenges, and this proposal is no ex-
ception. Many of the challenges have been addressed above. This Section 
briefly tackles an additional key challenge: formal legitimacy. 
Two alternative options can serve as the formal legal basis for the agen-
cy’s actions. Ideally, federal and state legislators would promulgate compre-
hensive statutory schemes that govern the agency’s mission, along the lines of 
the European model.262 Such legislation could define exploitation (or unfair-
ness), provide lists of presumably unfair terms, and vest the appropriate federal 
or state agencies with explicit authority to detect and respond to exploitative 
boilerplate as delineated above. 
Alternatively, and somewhat more realistically, consumer protection 
agencies can take the initiative to legitimize the agency action. These agencies 
can begin implementing the proposed reform as part of their general mandate 
under the Federal Trade Commission Act and parallel UDAP statutes to protect 
consumers from “unfair and deceptive” business practices.263 This, of course, 
requires agencies (and governments) to embrace the idea that firms offering 
consumers exploitative terms is an unfair or deceptive business practice. 
Such an interpretation is not far-fetched. Repeatedly and pervasively of-
fering consumers one-sided, non-salient terms, to which the informed consum-
er would not agree, seems to be an unfair practice. When the exploitative term 
is legally invalid, as often is the case, such a practice may not only be unfair, 
but also deceptive. The term’s inclusion in an otherwise binding contract can 
deceive consumers into believing that they are likewise bound by the legally 
invalid term, when in fact they are not.264 
In fact, a thorough examination of UDAP legislation will reveal a surpris-
ing fact: five jurisdictions already explicitly regard the inclusion of uncon-
scionable terms in a consumer contract as an unfair practice. In California, for 
example, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act defines “[i]nserting an uncon-
                                                                                                                           
262 See infra note 155 and accompanying text (surveying international consumer protection prac-
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263 See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
264 See discussion supra Subsection I.B.1. (discussing the prevalence of legally invalid terms); see 
also Beale, supra note 73, at 1017 (defining deception as a “representation, omission, or practice that 
is likely to mislead a reasonable consumer”). 
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scionable provision in the contract” as an unlawful act.265 Similarly, in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, it is an unfair or deceptive trade practice to “make or enforce 
unconscionable terms or provisions in sales or leases.”266 The same is true for 
New York if such practice is “repeated,”267 and for Indiana, though under 
somewhat more restrictive conditions.268 
Recently, Vermont has taken matters a step further, enacting detailed leg-
islation that defines certain one-sided form terms as presumably unconsciona-
ble. If that presumption is not rebutted, a court may find the drafting party re-
sponsible for committing an unfair and deceptive practice and order it to pay 
up to one thousand dollars for every offense.269 
True, defining “unconscionable” under these statutes poses an interpretive 
challenge.270 In this context, an unconscionable provision should be under-
stood as a substantively, rather than procedurally, unfair term. This aligns with 
our tentative definition of unfairness,271 which overlaps, to a considerable ex-
tent, with the three-pronged fairness test of section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act.272 Arguably, this federal standard, which seems quite de-
manding, can serve as a useful guideline for both federal and state enforcement 
agencies. 
Finally, it is also worth noting that in at least twenty-eight states, UDAP 
legislation delegates rulemaking authority to the state consumer protection 
agencies.273 This can serve as a basis not only for responding to exploitative 
boilerplate but also for promulgating and publishing rules that will clarify the 
types of terms that shall be presumed exploitative in different types of con-
sumer transactions across different economic sectors. This, in turn, can en-
                                                                                                                           
265 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770(a)(19) (West 2021), amended by Assemb. B. 790, 2021–2022 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2021) (enacted). 
266 D.C. CODE § 28-3904(r) (2021). 
267 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 2021). 
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10(b)(1) (2021). 
269 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 6055 (2021). 
270 See discussion supra Subsection 1.B.2. (noting, inter alia, the conceptual ambiguity of uncon-
scionability as a doctrine). 
271 See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
272 Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). This Act limits the agency’s enforce-
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273 See David Berman, Note, A Critique of Consumer Advocacy Against the Restatement of the 
Law of Consumer Contracts, 54 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 49, 52, 85–89 (2020) (advocating the 
revitalization of UDAP statutes to combat unfair terms by publishing “blacklists” of prohibited terms). 
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hance the impact of the agency’s activity and, with it, the potential success of 
the proposed reform.274 
Additional legitimacy-related challenges concern securing public trust 
and confidence in the agency’s competence and integrity and minimizing the 
risk of regulatory capture by interested groups.275 These are legitimate con-
cerns that accompany any proposal for additional regulation of economic mar-
kets. Serious as they are, they are not unique to this context and do not, in 
themselves, justify relinquishing efforts to improve efficiency and fairness in 
consumer markets. The formation of holistic, consistent, transparent, and inno-
vative operating policies can ensure that such challenges are considered seri-
ously and met with success. 
CONCLUSION 
Faced with lengthy, dense, unreadable, and non-negotiable form con-
tracts, consumers forgo any attempt to negotiate these terms or to evaluate 
their significance. Ideally, form-drafters should factor in consumers’ interests 
and offer transparent, fair, and efficient terms. Nevertheless, firms’ superior 
knowledge, power, and near-absolute discretion as to the content of their con-
tracts, coupled with the inherent failures of consumer markets to self-regulate, 
inevitably results in the widespread use of exploitative contract terms. 
Scholars and policy-makers in the United States have offered three main 
disciplinary options to tackle this problem. Unfortunately, each of these alter-
natives has severe limitations. There seems to be an ever-growing consensus 
that, even combined, market forces, legislative intervention, and judicial scru-
tiny still fail to adequately discipline sellers from using and relying on unfair, 
unconscionable, and even legally invalid terms. This ongoing reality harms 
consumers, honest traders, and society as a whole. 
Given this resounding failure, one wonders—where to from here? This 
Article’s answer is administrative control. Such a strategy has clear advantages 
compared to current approaches. Its potential is promising. Surprisingly 
enough, though, this path has been left largely unexplored. 
Just like in the fight against an evasive virus, the best tactic to confront 
the widespread use of exploitative terms is not to chase them individually ex 
post. Rather, a superior approach would focus on preventing exposure to mass 
exploitative boilerplate terms ex ante. This Article is a first attempt to delineate 
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the contours of such an enforcement model and to fill it with detailed process 
suggestions. 
To be sure, administrative oversight is not a panacea, and this proposal is 
exposed to various criticisms and challenges. Although this Article addressed 
some of these challenges, critical readers—and reality itself—may identify or 
bring about others. Challenges and critiques are inherent to any effort to ex-
plore a new path toward the solution of an old and persistent problem. In fact, 
they should serve as important checks and valuable stepping stones on the way 
to developing a better legal regime. 
Rather than allowing harmful boilerplate terms to continue flooding con-
sumer markets, policy-makers should make a conscious effort to significantly 
reduce the frequency at which firms offer such terms to consumers in the first 
place. Instead of expecting consumers to identify, understand, and react to ex-
ploitative standard terms, a shrewd and cost-effective public monitoring sys-
tem could detect, deter, and effectively respond to the massive use of such 
terms. 
Importantly, this call for administrative control does not entail throwing 
out the baby with the bathwater and forgoing all the other protective measures 
currently in use. Rather, this proposal is an additional preventive regulatory 
tool that has been unduly neglected for too long. Ultimately, American con-
sumers and markets deserve better protection from the harms of exploitative 
boilerplate. Administrative oversight of consumer contracts could be an im-
portant component in ending firms’ license to contractually exploit consumers. 
 
 
 
